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"A person stands a better chance of being tried and judged for
killing one human being than for killing 100,000."
-Jose Ayala Lasso, former United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is necessary that States2 ensure all individuals responsible for atrocities are
brought to justice. A greater understanding of universal jurisdiction will enable it
to be used as an effective weapon against the evasion of punishment through
immunity and amnesty.3 Alleged human rights violations by citizens and leaders
of Kosovo,' Rwanda, s Israel, and Chile7 have awakened the principle of universal
jurisdiction. For example, Ariel Sharon, former Minister of Defense for Israel, is
responsible for massacres committed by the Philange militia.8 Sabra and Shatila,9
located in West Beruit, were home to over 14,000 civilian refugees.' ° On
1. United Nations, Establishment of an International Criminal Court (last visited Feb. 11, 2002), at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. § 201 (1986) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (defining a State under international law as "an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to
engage in, formal relations with other such entities").
3. See Barbara Crossette, Guide Proposed for Trials of Rogue Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at
A2 (explaining that as long as people do not understand universal jurisdiction due to its confusing
jurisprudence, it cannot be used as a very potent weapon against impunity).
4. See Victors' Justice; Should Sovereignty be Sacrificed for War Crime Trials?, NEWSDAY, July 8,
2001, at BOI (exposing Slobodan Milosevic's indictment at the Hague for crimes committed against humanity
by the Serb troops under his command during the civil war in Kosovo).
5. See Adama Dieng, Africans Need the Laws and Courts to Punish Their Warlords, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Aug. 21, 2001, at 6 (stating that two Rwandan nuns and two politicians were tried in Brussels under the
principle of universal jurisdiction for crimes associated with the 1994 genocide crimes in Rwanda).
6. See Anton La Guardia, West Accused of Double Standards on Atrocities, International Justice is a
Selective Affair, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24472471 (addressing Belgium's suit
against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for the massacre of 2,000 Palestinians by his country's allies in
1982).
7. See Amnesty Int'l, Universal Jurisdiction: 14 Principles on the Effective Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction, at http://www.igc.org/icc/html/ai199904.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2001) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (examining the extradition of Augusto Pinochet, former head of state of Chile, by the
United Kingdom).
8. See The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights & the Environment, The Complaint
Against Ariel Sharon for His Involvement in the Massacres at Sabra and Shatila, Official Translation from the
French, available at http://www.lawsociety.org/sharon/complaint.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that Sharon was charged with crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes).
9. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Belgium: Amnesty International Urges Investigation of
Ariel Sharon (Mar. 10, 2001), available at http://www.amnesty-usa.org/news/2001/belgiumlOO32001.html
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that Sabra and Shatila are refugee camps just outside
of Beirut).
10. The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights & the Environment, supra note.
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September 15, 1982, upon orders by General Ariel Sharon, Israeli tanks and
soldiers surrounded these "camps."" Once surrounded, 150 members of the
Phalangist militia invaded the "camps" over a period of forty hours.12 Hundreds,
possibly thousands, 3 of women, children and elderly were raped, injured, or
killed. 4 As recounted by those who survived the event, the axe-wielding militia
dismembered and mutilated bodies. 5 Another horrendous account of the attacks
described how the militia lined up a family in their own home, shot each member
repeatedly, and left them for dead. 6 One survivor of this brutality was shot on
three separate occasions over a forty-eight hour period.1
7
Charges against Sharon were brought in Belgium for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 8 However,
Sharon asserted the defense of immunity, as he is a sitting head of state. 9 A
leader responsible for atrocities, such as Sharon, should not be able to evade
punishment by hiding behind his position as a head of state.Y Sharon's actions
were violations of international law, regardless of his position in the Israeli
government and who literally executed his orders.2'
How can a leader allegedly responsible for these atrocities escape
prosecution? A State court must have jurisdiction in order to hear or to decide
matters brought before it.2 Generally, the concept of jurisdiction gives a State
11. See iL
12. See id.
13. See id. (indicating that "[tihe count of victims varies between 700 (the official Israeli figure) and
3,500 (notably in the inquiry launched by the Israeli journalist Kapeliouk)").
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. (describing events as recounted by survivor Su'ad Srour Meri, one of the family members
lined up and shot three times). The shootings resulted in the death of Mrs. Meri's "father, three brothers (aged
11, 6 and 3) and two sisters (18 months and 9 months)." Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Chris Gray, Sharon: May Face Charges over Massacre in 1982, INDEP. (London), Nov. 29,
2001, at 17 (indicating that Sharon's lawyers are arguing that Belgium cannot exercise universal jurisdiction
over Sharon because he enjoys immunity as a sitting head of state).
20. See Sharon Hearings Close in Belgium (Jan. 23, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/ 2002/WORLD/
europe/01/23/belgium.sharon/?related (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (indicating that Sharon
claims he is entitled to immunity because he is currently Prime Minister of Israel); see also Press Release,
Amnesty International, International Court of Justice Upholds Immunity for Ministers of Foreign Affairs: A
Major Setback for the Fight Against Impunity (Feb. 14, 2001), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/
web/news.nsf/print/4DB64C795F185B0180256B60005C063E (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(declaring "[n]o one should enjoy immunity from crimes under international law, which are so serious that the
international community has accepted that it is the responsibility of all state to bring the perpetrators to
justice").
21. See The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights & the Environment, supra note 8
(discussing the specific charges against Sharon for the acts committed, including genocide, crimes against
humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).
22. See Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.), 1999 I.C.J. 113 (June 2)
(finding that because the court lacks jurisdiction to hear Yugoslavia's Application of a claim to the court, the
court cannot make any decision whatsoever in regard to that matter and must dismiss the action).
359
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court the power to exercise authority over persons and things and to issue
decisions or decrees over persons in a given geographic area.2 ' However, a clear
definition of international criminal jurisdiction is more difficult to articulate.
The traditional foundation of international criminal jurisdiction is often expressed
as "[t]he interests of sovereign nations in obtaining and maintaining jurisdiction
over their nationals, their territory, and acts that affect their broader welfare."
International criminal jurisdiction is a court's power to hear and to determine
criminal matters, occurring between different States or persons of different
26
States. International criminal law encompasses some, but not all, human rights
and humanitarian law.27 Violations of human rights and humanitarian law
categorized as international crimes include war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide. 8
Several types of international jurisdiction have been defined by international
law.29 For instance, international law permits universal jurisdiction over personswho commit crimes so heinous as to be considered of universal interest.3
23. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (7th ed. 1999) (stating the definitions for various types of
jurisdiction); see also Infoplease Dictionary, Jurisdiction, at http://infoplease.com/ipd/A0502550.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that the definition of jurisdiction
also includes "the extent or range of judicial ... authority" and "the territory over which it is exercised").
24. See Stacy J. Ratner, Establishing the Extraterrestrial: Criminal Jurisdiction and the International
Space Station, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 328 (1999) (discussing traditional bases of criminal
jurisdiction in international law with their foundation in the ability to balance state sovereignty with the interests
of a State in obtaining jurisdiction over its citizens).
25. Id. at 328 (indicating that there are four theories of international criminal jurisdiction recognized
throughout the world). Subjective territoriality allows a State to assert jurisdiction over any crime committed
within its borders. Id. Objective territoriality permits a State to exercise jurisdiction where a crime occurs
outside the State's borders and has an effect within the State. Id. at 329. Nationality theory gives a State
jurisdiction over crimes committed by its citizens regardless of where committed. Id. The protective principle
authorizes jurisdiction in situations where offenses committed outside the State's border "cause or threaten to
cause adverse effects on the country's security, integrity, or sovereignty." Id. at 329-30.
26. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 855-56 (defining criminal jurisdiction as "a
court's power to hear criminal cases"). International jurisdiction is defined as "a court's power to hear and
determine matters between different countries or persons of different countries." Id.
27. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 12 (1997) (maintaining that international criminal
law has criminalized acts constituting atrocities against the person, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity). "[I]nternational humanitarian law.., addresses both limits on warmaking methods... and
protections of certain individuals during war time . I... d. at 9.
28. See id. at 12 (explaining that in order for the acts that constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide to be crimes, the "acts must take place in a certain context, pattern, or setting"). For example,
"against a particular group with an intent to destroy it (genocide), in a systematic manner based on certain traits
of the victims (crimes against humanity), or during armed conflict (war crimes)." Id.
29. See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 785
(1998) (discussing the principles devised by international law that determine the scope of a State's jurisdiction
over acts that affect other States); see generally Ratner, supra note 24, at 328-30 (discussing four theories of
international criminal jurisdiction, including subjective/objective territoriality, nationality theory, the protective
principle, and the doctrine of universal interest).
30. See Mark R. Von Steinberg, A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals:
Universal Jurisdiction and the "Elementary Dictates of Humanity", 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 151 (1996)
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Violations of humanitarian and human rights law are considered crimes of
universal interest.3' Once a crime of universal interest is committed, the State has
jurisdiction over both the offender and his actions, even if the State has no
connection to the perpetrator, the crime, or the victim. 32 Therefore, universal
jurisdiction allows a State to prosecute a criminal with no connection to the
prosecuting State in order to facilitate deterrence by prosecution of crimes
condemned by international law.33
The assertion of universal jurisdiction is premised on the concept that
"certain crimes are so serious that all of humanity has reason to bring the
perpetrators to justice."34 Traditionally, universal jurisdiction has been based on
customary international law35 and international agreements.36 If a State refuses to
prosecute persons who commit grave breaches of international human rights
law, universal jurisdiction may require that State to extradite the individual to
another State or to an international criminal court to prosecute the individual on
behalf of all the States.38 If States did not have the duty to prosecute or, in the
(maintaining that "states have a compelling interest, as well as an obligation, inter se to cooperate in the
criminal process and bring violators of such fundamental norms to justice").
31. See id. at 152 (indicating that universal jurisdiction applies where it is provided for under customary
or conventional international law and individual criminal responsibility is alleged).
32. See Doug Cassel, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Empowering
United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 35 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 421, 428 (2001) (stating that "'universal jurisdiction' is exercised when a state prosecutes crimes
committed outside its borders, without regard to the nationality of the perpetrator or tvictim [sic], the location of
the crime or other specific link to the prosecuting state").
33. See Ratner, supra note 24, at 330.
34. Rivandans on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at A22 (explaining the base of universal jurisdiction
as a State's refusal to provide sanctuary to those persons who commit crimes against humanity); see also
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (1985) (recognizing the "universality principle" as a fundamental
area of international law for assertion of jurisdiction over certain offenses).
35. See Byard Q. Clemmons, A Changing of the Guard, 48 FED. LAw. 11, 12 (2001) (defining
customary international law as a "body of unwritten law that is reflected in the widespread practice of nation-
states that involves a sense of legal obligation to so behave"); see also Lee A. Steven, Genocide and the Duty to
Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States is in Breach of Its International Obligation, 39 VA. J. INT'L. L.
425, 431-32 (1999) (discussing the basis for exercising domestic jurisdiction under customary international law,
and setting forth two rationales for the use of universal jurisdiction: crimes such as piracy and slave-trading
went unpunished without universal jurisdiction because they often occurred on the high-seas where no country
had territorial jurisdiction, and the serious nature of some crimes threatens the stability of the whole
international community).
36. See Jon B. Jordon, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All Nations Against
International Crime, 9 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (2000) (providing the sources of universal jurisdiction as
customary international law, which allows for universal jurisdiction over piracy, slave trade, war crimes, and
genocide, and international agreements or treaties, which cover crimes such as hijacking, terrorism, torture, and
apartheid); see also Clemmons, supra note 35, at 12 (indicating that international agreements often include
bilateral and multilateral agreements or treaties).
37. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 9 (stating that "international human rights law refers to
the body of international law aimed at protecting the human dignity of the individual").
38. See Nicole Barrett, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations of Customary
International Law: The U.S. Bombardment of Cambodia and Laos, 32 COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 429, 469
(2001) (confronting the ability of States with laws allowing for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, such as
Belgium, to prosecute leaders of the United States for overseeing war crimes committed in Cambodia and
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alternative, to extradite persons responsible for crimes offensive to all of
humanity, perpetrators would go unpunished.
In addition, universal jurisdiction allows individual States to define and to
prescribe punishment for offenses of universal concern under international law. 9
"'[U]niversal jurisdiction' encompasses both permissive and mandatory forms,
where a state may and where a state must exercise jurisdiction."40 Determining
the form of universal jurisdiction is important when considering the defense of
amnesty.' Universal jurisdiction is permissive when exercised under customary
international law.42 If universal jurisdiction is permissive, under customary
international law, each individual State may exercise universal jurisdiction over
the crime by enacting conforming legislation. 43 Alternatively, the exercise of
universal jurisdiction is generally mandatory under treaty requirements. 44 If
Laos).
39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 404 (giving examples of certain offenses of universal interest.
including "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts
of terrorism").
40. Bruce Broomhall, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Towards the
Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 399, 401 (2001).
41. See Roman Boed, The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute
Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Violations, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 297, 313 (2000); see also
Juan E. Mendez & Salvador Tinajero-Esquivel, The Cavallo Case: A New Test for Universal Jurisdiction, 8
HUM. RTS. BRIEF No. 3, at 5, 7 (2001) (mentioning that an element of the test for determining whether an
individual's claim of amnesty will be respected turns on whether the treaty or customary international law under
which an individual is charged requires prosecution and punishment).
42. See Broomhall, supra note 40, at 404-06 (discussing that the "permissive approach might be thought
to tolerate the possibility of safe-havens and thereby undermine accountability"). Some commentators argue
crimes under customary international law are really mandatory and not permissive. Id.; see also Inbal Sansani,
The Pinochet Precedent in Africa: Prosecution of Hissene Habre, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF No. 2, at 32, 33 (2001)
(indicating that "permissi[ve] universal jurisdiction is more sweeping" than mandatory universal jurisdiction
because it covers matters of custom and not just crimes under treaties).
43. See generally Broomhall, supra note 40, at 404-06 (discussing the debate on whether customary
international law creates permissive or mandatory universal jurisdiction).
44. C.f Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 535 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture
Convention] (illustrating an example of a treaty requiring signatory parties to exercise jurisdiction over the
listed offenses). Art. 5 states:
Article 5. 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board
a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory
under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with
internal law.
Id.
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universal jurisdiction is mandatory, each individual State must enact conforming
legislation.4 However, the State may expand its duties, scope, and jurisdiction
under a particular treaty by enacting a statute to this effect.46 In doing so, crimes
under a treaty are made crimes under State domestic laws.47 The laws permit the
exercise of universal jurisdiction over those persons who commit these crimes.48
Although universal jurisdiction gives States jurisdiction over persons who
commit certain types of crimes, domestic legislation often differs among States
with respect to the substantive law defining a particular crime and the procedure
of how criminal statutes will be applied.49 To ameliorate this obstacle, universal
jurisdiction allows States to hale individuals into court for certain listed crimes
and to prosecute these individuals under the State's domestic laws, even though
the crime was not committed within the State and the individual has no
connection to that State. ° Thus, as long as a State's laws provide for universal
jurisdiction over crimes determined to be of universal concern by customary
international law or by treaty, the State may prosecute those individuals
responsible for committing such crimes.
This Comment explores the application of universal jurisdiction over
individuals committing human rights violations and ultimately advocates The
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction"' as a viable solution for the
creation of uniform guidelines for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 2 By
examining the history of universal jurisdiction under international law, Part HI
illustrates the need for universal jurisdiction as recourse for victims of gross
45. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 156-61 (explaining that many States often enact
legislation that is broader than the requirements prescribed in the treaties that they become parties to); see also
Torture Convention, supra note 44, at art. 4. Art. 4 states:
Article 4. 1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.
The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes
complicity or participation in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature.
Id.
46. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 13.
47. See id.
48. See il
49. See id. at 67 (discussing the problems that arise because the international community does not
always have the same definition of a particular crime).
50. See Jordon, supra note 36, at 3-4 (specifying the extraordinary characteristics of universal
jurisdiction including the lack of a requirement for the State to have a connection to the criminal or to the crime,
as well as the ability of a State to apply its own laws to citizens of other States, but not to the State itself that
committed the crime).
51. The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction were drafted as part of a project at Princeton
University, and are an attempt to define what universal jurisdiction is and how its proper exercise can promote
greater justice. For a complete discussion on The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction within the
context of this Comment, see infra notes 269-303 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 269-303 and accompanying text (discussing The Princeton Principles' solution for
the lack of uniformity regarding immunity and amnesty in international law).
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violations of international human rights law.53 Part II also discusses several laws
that allow for the use of universal jurisdiction, including the Belgium Act
Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of Humanitarian Law- and
Spain's Organic Law of the Judicial Power.55 Part III addresses the difficulty of
prosecuting heads of state because of international laws allowing immunity and
amnesty. Part IV examines possible solutions to the lack of uniformity in the
enforcement of universal jurisdiction due to the defenses of immunity and
amnesty.57 Possible solutions include The Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction or the formation and implementation of an International Criminal
Court by the Rome Statute. Part V concludes with the argument that a
combination of the adoption of the Princeton Principles by all States and the
formation of an International Criminal Court will raise accountability in
accordance with international law. The use of uniform domestic legislation and
the formation of a permanent international criminal court will create an
international criminal justice system effective to hold all persons responsible for
their heinous actions.
II. THE HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
A review of the origin, the history, and the application of universal
jurisdiction over the last fifty years is helpful to ascertain the problems inherent
in the concept."' The domestic laws of Belgium and Spain illustrate how
53. See infra notes 59-82 and accompanying text (setting forth the creation of universal jurisdiction over
the crime of piracy and its expansion to other human rights violations after World War II and the Geneva
Conventions).
54. See infra notes 86-129 and accompanying text (setting forth the evolution of Belgium's current law
on universal jurisdiction from ratification of the Geneva Conventions in 1951 to the adoption of a domestic law
in 1999).
55. See infra notes 130-57 and accompanying text (setting forth Spain's exercise of universal
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity under its domestic laws).
56. See infra notes 158-270 and accompanying text (discussing immunities and amnesties from
prosecution given to heads of state and the controversy surrounding their ability to exempt individuals from
prosecution under universal jurisdiction).
57. See infra notes 269-303 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of The Princeton Principles
and the relevant provisions that may solve the lack of uniformity in allowing immunity and amnesty from
universal jurisdiction, and examining the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court to supplement
domestic legislation providing for universal jurisdiction).
58. See Melinda White, Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, and Impunity, 7 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 209,
210 (2000) (explaining that the use of universal jurisdiction by domestic legislation has only been in existence
since 1946). "Traditionally, states were the subjects of international law not people." Id.; see also Major
Christopher M. Supernor, International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement of
Justice, 50 A.F. L. REV. 215, 218-30 (2001) (indicating that domestic universal jurisdiction was first created in
1948 through the United Nations' approval of the Geneva Conventions, but that the creation of ad hoc tribunals,
the proposal for the International Criminal Court, and the increased use of universal jurisdiction by the States
since the 1990s illustrates its seldom use until then); see also RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 156
(discussing the exercise of universal jurisdiction by third countries through domestic legislation). "Prosecutions
for human rights atrocities committed outside a state by foreigners have been rare, although they are not
unknown." Id.
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universal jurisdiction is codified and applied by individual States. The problems
encountered by Belgium and Spain emphasize the lack of uniformity in universal
jurisdiction laws regarding the recognition of the defenses of immunity and
amnesty. This lack of uniformity has caused the most difficulties in applying
universal jurisdiction.
A. Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law
For over 500 years,59 States throughout the world have exercised universal
jurisdiction over crimes of piracy6 As a result of World War II, the four 1949
Geneva Conventions" entered into force requiring extradition or prosecution, by
signatory States,62 of persons committing "grave breaches."63 A "grave breach" is
illustrated by the Nazi Party's actions in Germany during World War H.6' The
atrocities committed by the Nazi Party against the Jews consisted of imprisoning
the victims in concentration camps where they were routinely beat, starved,
59. See Michael P. Scharf, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects:
Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV.
363, 369 (2001) (noting that the reason piracy has been recognized as a crime for which universal jurisdiction
has been exercised for so long is due to its fleeting nature and the difficulty of pursuit of the perpetrators by the
victim State's authorities).
60. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1169 (defining the term piracy as "[riobbery,
kidnapping, or other criminal violence committed at sea; a similar crime committed aboard a plane or other
vehicle"). See generally Randall, supra note 29, at 791-98 (discussing the evolution of universal jurisdiction
over the crime of piracy).
61. Geneva Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu
3Ib/ qgenevl.htm; Geneva Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.un
hchr.ch/html/menu3/b/q-genev2.htm; Geneva Convention [i Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at http:llwww.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu3/bl91.htm; Geneva Convention
[IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available
at http:lwww.unhchr.chlhtml/menu3/b/93.htm [hereinafter collectively referred to as the Geneva Conventions]
(copies on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (codifying the laws of war in order to hold individuals
accountable for their actions).
62. See Broomhall, supra note 40, at 403 (explaining that States party to the Conventions "are under a
duty to search for persons alleged to have committed grave breaches, regardless of their nationality, to bring
them before their own courts or alternatively to hand them over to another State Party for prosecution").
63. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE
296 (New Press 2000). "'Grave breaches' of the Geneva Convention are committed by unlawful treatment of
certain categories of combatants (the sick and wounded, prisoners-of-war, etc.) and of civilians, but only in time
of international armed conflict." Id.
64. See Henry T. King, Jr., Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects, War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: The Nuremberg Precedent, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 281, 283 (2001)
(discussing how the Nuremburg proceedings were implemented to punish individuals involved in World War IH
who committed "crimes which are so heinous that they are crimes not only against the victims but against all
humanity"). "[The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and
so devastating that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being
repeated." Id. at 281.
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tortured, and killed.65 This was all done for the purpose of ending "the influence
of free labor, the churches and the Jews." Following World War II, courts in
Australia, Britain, Canada, and Israel began exercising universal jurisdiction over67 68
crimes against humanity 6' and war crimes. However, for the fifty years
following the Nuremberg trials and the drafting of the Geneva Conventions in the
1940s, universal jurisdiction has not been consistently exercised in the
international community.69 Leaders of many States have violated international
law, potentially subjecting themselves to universal jurisdiction; often, however,
such leaders simply claimed immunity and exempted themselves from
prosecution under universal jurisdiction.70 These exemptions were based on state
sovereignty.7' State sovereignty stands for the proposition that States are allowed
to act independently in return for the reciprocal respect of that independence
from other States.72 Thus, States did not want to interfere with the actions of other
States' leaders, who were considered to be acting on behalf of their State, by
exercising universal jurisdiction. In addition to exemptions from prosecution for
heads of state, infrequent disclosure by States or other international organizations
of the atrocities surrounding these crimes subject to universal jurisdiction has
65. See generally Robert Jackson, Nuremberg Trials, Opening Address for the United States (1946),
available at http:l/fcit.coedu.usf.eduIHOLOCAUST/resource/documentlDocJacOl.htm (last visited Jan. 6,
2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (indicating that the acts committed by the Nazi Party
against the Jews as one of the first events of international concern).
66. See id.
67. See ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 295 (defining crimes against humanity as "inhumane acts of a
very serious nature committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on
political, ethnic or religious grounds... committed in times of peace or of war").
68. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 7 (recognizing that the courts in Australia, Canada, Israel, and Britain
only exercised universal jurisdiction in the last 50 years for crimes committed during the Second World War);
see also Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis
Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter] (defining, for the first time, international crimes including crimes against
humanity and requiring individual responsibility for the commission of any acts constituting such grave
violations of international humanitarian law).
69. See Broomhall, supra note 40, at 399 (postulating that "[a]fter fifty years of relative neglect,"
universal jurisdiction now stands to become an important and supplemental component of the international
justice system due to recent cases and the formation of the International Criminal Court).
70. See Barrett, supra note 38, at 430 (indicating that the international community and domestic States'
concern for allowing government officials to escape punishment for the commission of crimes against humanity
under the principle of immunity).
71. See Charles Pierson, Pinochet and the End of Immunity: England's House of Lords Holds that a
Former Head of State is Not Inumune for Torture, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 263, 269-70 (2000) (explaining
that state sovereignty was the traditional basis for allowing immunity to States and officials acting on their
behalf).
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1418 (defining state sovereignty as "[tihe right of a
state to self-government; the supreme authority exercised by each state").
73. See ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 2 (explaining that the feudal concept of sovereignty did not allow
one sovereign to infringe upon the rights of another sovereign without their authorized concession through a
treaty).
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contributed to the lack of prosecution.74
Since the formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994,
universal jurisdiction has increasingly given rise to national investigations and
prosecutions in more than a dozen States.75 Belgium, Britain, Spain, and the
United States are among those States beginning to investigate, prosecute or
extradite7 under the auspices of universal jurisdiction.77 Not since the trials at
Nuremberg in the 1940s, which involved prosecution for the atrocities committed
by the Nazi Party during World War II, has universal jurisdiction been exercised
to the extent it has within the last decade.7s Tribunals have raised the level of
accountability for crimes against humanity and have turned acts that would
otherwise be seen as beneficial for current and aspiring State leaders into serious
political hindrances. 79  "This spread of accountability reflects the early
glimmerings of an international criminal justice system and the gradual
emergence of inhibitions against massive crimes hitherto tolerated or condoned
by the international community."8 The policy of holding persons accountable for
international crimes has become more widespread and, in turn, has led to an
increased use of universal jurisdiction by third party States.8 The increase in the
74. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,
59 AtrT. LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS. 9, 11 (1996) (addressing the small number of prosecutions that have taken
place since World War II, and attributing the cause to the fact that only two "internationally established ad hoc
investigatory commissions and two ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda" have been created by the
international community to deal with human rights violations).
75. See Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Belgian Court Judgment is a Great Step in the Fight Against
Impunity (June 11, 2001), available at 2001 WL 20826978 (citing an Amnesty International study finding that
of the approximately 120 States with legislation allowing for universal jurisdiction, most of this legislation is
too weak to accomplish true justice).
76. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 605 (defining extradition as "the official surrender
of an alleged criminal by one state or nation to another having jurisdiction of the crime charged; the return of a
fugitive from justice, regardless of consent, by the authorities where the fugitive resides").
77. See Press Release, supra note 75 (listing the countries that have began using universal jurisdiction
since the formation of the International Criminal Tribunals, in 1993 and 1994, to include Austria, Belgium,
Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United
States).
78. See Beth Van Schaaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights
Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 144 (2001)
(discussing the increased prosecution of individuals committing grave international crimes by States through
domestic legislation and customary international law).
79. See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 9 (2001) (examining the impact of the international criminal tribunals on post-
conflict peace building efforts, as well as the tribunals' effect on the future of the international criminal justice
system). For example, "Slobodian Milosevic lost reelection to the presidency of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and, refusing to accept the results, was forced out of office through massive street demonstrations in
Serbia." Id at 8. Prior to the use of universal jurisdiction by States and the creation of international criminal
tribunals, Milosevic may not have lost reelection for committing crimes against humanity, but may have been
seen as a strong political leader. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. (discussing the broader efforts of the tribunals in streamlining the importance of
accountability and transforming the history of impunity to hold persons liable from the more traditional issues
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number of States exercising universal jurisdiction has made the inconsistencies in
its use and its application more apparent.
82
B. Universal Jurisdiction Laws Effective in 2002
States have applied universal jurisdiction irregularly since the 1990s. s3
Domestic legislation providing for universal jurisdiction is derived from treaties
and customary international law. However, each State is free to expand and to
alter international law provisions in order to comply with that State's individual
needs.85 This has led to the irregular application of universal jurisdiction, as well
as to an overall lack of uniformity.
Examples of how State laws are created and applied further indicate the
problems associated with enforcing universal jurisdiction, specifically
recognition of immunity and amnesty as defenses. The laws of Belgium and
Spain are excellent illustrations of the evolution, the successes, and the failures of
universal jurisdiction. Thus, these States' laws provide useful tools for analyzing
the future of domestic universal jurisdiction.
1. Belgium's Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of
Humanitarian Law
Belgium's use of universal jurisdiction has undergone significant evolution
over the last fifty years. In 1951, Belgium ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
which granted universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity; however, no• 86
domestic legislation was implemented. As a result, Belgium had no legislation
conferring it the right to assert universal jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity, as defined under the Geneva Conventions. However, under principles
of state sovereignty).
82. See generally AMNESTY INT'L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTY OF STATES TO ENACT AND
IMPLEMENT LEGISLATION (Sept. 2001), available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc-pdf.nsf/indexl
IOR53009200 IENGLISH/$File/IOR530090 I.pdf (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
83. See generally id. at 4-79 (discussing the universal jurisdiction legislation adopted by approximately
95 States and giving examples of how the legislation has been used).
84. See id. at 1-3 (explaining the types of legislation adopted by States permitting the exercise of
universal jurisdiction).
85. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (analyzing how customary and conventional
international law become domestic law by ratification or adoption by States).
86. See Act of 16 June 1993 Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and II of 18 June 1977 (BeIg., Official Journal), as modified
by the Act of 10 Feb. 1999 Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of Humanitarian Law, 38 I.L.M. 918,
921 (1999) [hereinafter Act Concerning Geneva Conventions and Act Concerning Humanitarian Law,
respectively] (indicating that although Belgian law did not provide for universal jurisdiction over crimes
specified in the Geneva Conventions, because Belgium did not enact a statute covering them until 1993,
Belgium retained universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide under the Genocide Convention in 1951).
87. See id.
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of customary international and natural law,8 Belgium continued to recognize
universal jurisdiction over actions constituting genocide. 9 It was not until 1993
that Belgium enacted a law implementing punishment for grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols P and 119 to the
conventions.2 The Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions added
"expanded protections for war victims, particularly civilians," 93 and the
Additional Protocol II applied universal jurisdiction to "conflicts of a non-
international character." By codifying the Geneva Conventions, Belgium gained
the responsibility of prosecuting or extraditing persons committing crimes during
international conflicts.95 Specifically, the 1993 Act gave Belgium universal
jurisdiction over "willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health, and extensive destruction of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.,
96
88. See BLACK'S LAW DIcriONARy, supra note 23, at 1049 (defining natural law as "a philosophical
system of legal and moral principles purportedly deriving from a universalized conception of human nature or
divine justice rather than from legislative or judicial action; moral law embodied in the principles of right and
wrong").
89. See Act Concerning Humanitarian Law, supra note 86 (indicating that the 1993 Act was not required
to comply with international obligations, but was thought to increase the prevention of the crimes defined in the
Act).
90. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, available at
http:llwww.unchr.chlhtmllmenu3/b/93.htm (copy of file with The Transnational Lawyer).
91. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1I), Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442, available at
http:llwww.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu3/b/94.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
92. See Act Concerning Geneva Conventions and Act Concerning Humanitarian Law, supra note 87
(imposing laws designed to allow Belgium to assert universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of war crimes set
forth in the Geneva Conventions).
93. See Barrett, supra note 38, at 429 (examining abuses of "humanitarian and customary international
law" as the result of decisions made throughout history, including the Holocaust and the U.S. reaction to Pearl
Harbor).
94. See Bassiouni, supra note 74, at 13-14 (arguing the need for more prosecutions of persons
committing grave breaches of international law arising out of conflicts of a non-international character, purely
internal conflicts, and tyrannical regime victimization).
95. See ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 178-79.
Each state has a duty, under articles common to the four Conventions which deal with
.repression of abuses and infractions', to search out suspects alleged to have committed
'grave breaches' of the Conventions and to put them on trial, regardless of their
nationality. 'Grave breaches' are crimes so serious that in 1949 states were prepared, by
ratifying the Conventions, to undertake to put the suspects on trial themselves or to
extradite him to a country prepared to do so.
Id.
96. l at 179 (indicating that the Geneva Conventions required the prosecution or extradition of persons
committing the crimes listed if occurring during an international conflict).
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In 1999, Belgium amended its 1993 universal jurisdiction law and adopted a
new domestic law97 expanding to cover grave breaches of international
humanitarian law, including genocide,8 crimes against humanity,99 and war
crimes."' The purpose of the Act of 10 February 1999 Concerning the
97. See Act Concerning Humanitarian Law, supra note 86 (citing text of 1999 amendment to the 1993
Act).
98. See id.
[Glenocide means any of the following acts, committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part
a national, ethnic, religious or racial group, as such:
1. [degree] killing members of the group;
2. [degrees] causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. [degrees] deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. [degrees] imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5. [degrees] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id.
99. See id.
[A] crime against humanity means any of the following acts, committed as part of a widespread or




4. [degrees] deportation or forcible transfer or popular;
5. [degrees] imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
6. [degrees] torture;
7. [degrees] rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
8. [degrees] persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity or political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in the Article.
Id.
100. See id.
[W]ithout prejudice to the criminal provisions applicable to other breaches of the Conventions
referred to in the present Act and without prejudice to criminal provisions applicable to breaches
committed out of negligence - constitute crimes under international law and be punishable in
accordance with the provisions of the present Act:
I. [degree] willful killing;
2. [degrees] torture or other inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
3. [degrees] willfully causing great suffering or serious damage to physical integrity or
health;
4. [degrees] compelling a prisoner of war, a civilian person protected by the Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War or a person protected in that
same respect by Protocols I and II additional to the international Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 to serve in the forces of a hostile power or adverse party;
5. [degrees] depriving a prisoner of war, a civilian person protected by the Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War or a person protected in that
same respect by Protocols I and II additional to the international Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 of the right to a regular and impartial trial in accordance with the
contents of those provisions;
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6. [degrees] the unlawful deportation, transfer or movement, or unlawful detention of a
civilian person protected by the Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War or of a person protected in that same respect by Protocols I and II
additional to the international Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;
7. [degrees] hostage-taking;
8. [degrees] extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military
necessity as permitted by international law and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
9. [degrees] acts and omissions not justified in law which are likely to endanger the physical
or mental health and integrity of persons protected by one of the Conventions relative to
the protection of wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, in particular any medical
procedure which is not indicated by the state of health of such persons or not consistent
with generally accepted medical standards;
10. [degrees] other than where justified under the conditions provided for in subparagraph 9
[degrees], acts which consist in carrying out on persons referred to in subparagraph 9
[degrees], even with their consent, physical mutilations, medical or scientific experiments
or the removal of tissue or organs for transplantation, except in the case of donations of
blood for transfusion or of skin for grafting, provided that such donations are voluntary,
consented to and intended for therapeutic purposes;
11. [degrees] making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;
12. [degrees] launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause loss of human life, injury to civilians
or damage to civilian objects which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated, without prejudice to the criminal nature of the
attack whose harmful effects, even where proportionate to the military advantage
anticipated, would be inconsistent with the principles of international law derived from
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience;
13. [degrees] launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces
in the knowledge that such attack will cause loss of human life, injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated, without prejudice to the criminal nature of the attack
whose harnful effects, even where proportionate to the military advantage anticipated,
would be inconsistent with the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience;
14. [degrees] making non-defended localities or demilitarized zones the object of attack;
15. [degrees] making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he/she is hors de
combat;
16. [degrees] the perfidious use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross;
17. [degrees] the transfer by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian population into
the territory it occupies, in the case of an international armed conflict, or by the
occupying authority in the case of a non-international armed conflict;
18. [degrees] unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;
19. [degrees] indulging in practices of apartheid or other inhuman or degrading practices
based on racial discrimination and resulting in outrages upon personal dignity;
20. [degrees] directing attacks against clearly recognized historic monuments, works of art or
places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples and to
which special protection has been given by special arrangement, where there is no
evidence of the adverse party having violated the prohibition of using such objects in
support of the military effort, and where such objects are not located in the immediate
proximity of military objectives.
Id.
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Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law was to prevent
the future commission of these violations of international law.'O In addition, this
Act extends to perpetrators not present within Belgium at the time charges are
filed or investigations are conducted.'02
The most significant, and possibly most controversial, change to Belgium's
1993 legislation' 3 was the elimination of immunity for State officials.'O° "Broadly
speaking, this provision can be read to preclude sovereign immunity as a defense,
regardless of whether the individual was acting in an official capacity at the time
of commission of the acts, or is acting in an official capacity at the time of the
suit, or both."'0 5 Belgium's approach to the defense of immunity differs from
other States, thus illustrating that immunity imparts a lack of uniformity to
universal jurisdiction. '°6
Belgium is a pioneer for promoting universal jurisdiction for several
reasons.' 7 First, Belgium has charged at least seven political figures with crimes
against humanity since 1988.08 Second, Belgium's convictions of perpetrators of
101. See id. (claiming "senators emphasized the symbolic and educational value of declaring genocide a
crime in itself"). Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are all human rights violations under
international law. Id.
102. See Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the
Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 606 (1997) (explaining that States may have the right to assert universal
jurisdiction over persons committing human rights violations that have no connection to the prosecuting state).
The use of Belgium's provision allowing for the prosecution of persons under universal jurisdiction without
their presence in Belgium for the prosecution has rarely been used. Id.
103. See Act Concerning Geneva Conventions and Act Concerning Humanitarian Law, supra note 86.
This discussion refers to changes made to the 1993 legislation by the 1999 Act. Id.
104. See Act Concerning Humanitarian Law, supra note 86.
Art. 5. § 1. No political, military or national interest or necessity, even on grounds of
reprisals, can justify the breaches provided for in Articles 1, 3 and 4 [degrees], without
prejudice to the exceptions referred to in subparagraphs 9 [degrees], 12 [degrees] and 13
[degrees] of paragraph 3 of Article 1.
§ 2. The fact that the defendant acted on the order of his/her government or a superior
shall not absolve him/her from responsibility where, in the prevailing circumstances, the
order could clearly result in the commission of a crime of genocide or of a crime against
humanity, as defined in the present Act, or a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocol I of 8 June 1977.
§ 3. The immunity attributed to the official capacity of a person, does not prevent the
application of the present Act.
Id.; see also Linda A. Malone, Trying to Try Sharon (Oct. 13, 2001), at http://english.pravda.rulpolitics/2001/
10/1 3/17976.html (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that domestic universal jurisdiction
is being subjected to a test in Belgium to determine whether "Belgium can invoke the mechanisms of
international law to prosecute a sitting head of state from another country").
105. Malone, supra note 104.
106. Marlise Simons, Human Rights Cases Begin to Flood Belgian Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001,
at A8 (indicating that one of the reasons so many cases are filed in Belgium is because its law on universal
jurisdiction is one of few that does not recognize immunity for sitting heads of state).
107. See Belgium 'Will Not Drop' Sharon Case, GULF NEWS, Sept. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL
27253894 (explaining Belgium's principle of universal jurisdiction in the context of Belgium's assertion of
jurisdiction over Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon).
108. See Marwaan Macan-Markar, Lawsuit Against Israel's Sharon Could Set Precedent, INTER PRESS
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genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes add "weight to the legitimacy
of universal jurisdiction."' ' Belgium's conviction of four Rwandans for war
crimes was the first time that a third party State convicted persons of war crimes
not directly affecting the prosecuting State." ° Belgium's actions enunciate an
intolerance for these crimes worldwide."' Third, Belgium was first to try and to
convict persons with a civilian jury, instead of a military or international tribunal
as traditionally used.
' 2
Aside from the positive aspects of the law, Belgium's Act caused numerous
problems. For example, after convicting two Rwandan nuns in June of 2001, " '
Belgium may have given its courts too much power regarding universal
jurisdiction under this Act."'4 Following the convictions, a lawsuit was brought in
Belgium to try Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel, for his role in massacres
that occurred in Beruit." 5 This type of trial has caused negative consequences for
Belgium. Illustrative of this is the statement of Foreign Minister Louis Michel,
who characterizes the law as "embarrassing""' 6 because heads of state are afraid
to visit Belgium due to the prospect of being arrested for crimes." 7 This is
problematic for Belgium because Belgium hosts headquarters for the European
SERVICE, June 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4804322 (indicating those charged with crimes against
humanity include "former Cambodian heads of state and government Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea; leng
Sary, foreign minister in Cambodia's Khmer Rouge regime; Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the former
Iranian president; erstwhile Moroccan interior minister Driss Basri; and Abdoulaye Yerodia, a former foreign
minister from the Democratic Republic of Congo," as well as Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel).
109. Id. (according to Vienna Corlucci of Amnesty International's United States division, the conviction
of four Rwandans by a Belgium court for war crimes committed in 1994 "[makes] it clear that such crimes will
not be tolerated and perpetrators cannot evade justice").
110. See id.
Ill. See id.
112. See id. (indicating that these developments will aid in the exercise of universal jurisdiction in other
States allowing for its use, which will lead to fewer places for persons committing these acts to hide).
113. See Rwvandans on Trial, supra note 34 (indicating that two nuns that were charged, in collaboration
with a physics professor and a businessman, with state-orchestrated genocide resulting in the deaths of more
than half a million ethnic Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994); see also Belgian Court: Nuns Guilty of War Crimes in
Rwanda, NEWSDAY, June 8, 2001, at A22 (indicating that evidence showed that one of the nuns forced refugees
to go to a nearby health center where they were massacred by Hutu militia, and that both nuns provided gasoline
to people who torched a garage containing 500 refugees).
114. See La Guardia, supra note 6 (indicating that Brussels is embarrassed by its lawsuit against Ariel
Sharon and wants to amend its law to exclude the prosecution of government leaders and ministers). But see
Press Release, supra note 76 ("Amnesty International is calling for Belgium not to weaken its universal
jurisdiction legislation in any way.").
115. See La Guardia, supra note 6 (conceding Belgium's embarrassment over this suit against a serving
head of state).
116. See Simons, supra note 106 (describing the debate surrounding Belgium's law on universal
jurisdiction and its disregard for claims of immunity, while recognizing that "some politicians and legal scholars
here are wondering if the nation has taken on too much"). The issue that is causing the Belgian government
trouble is its ability to have jurisdiction over current leaders of other States. Id.
117. See Gregory J. Hand, The Belgian Follies, ENTER STAGE RIGHT (Dec. 3, 2001), at http://www.enter
stageright.com/archive/articles/1201/1201belgiancourt.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(discussing Belgium's embarrassment when Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel, refused to visit Brussels).
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Union.1 s Although Belgium's law does not require a person to be present in
Belgium in order to initiate judicial proceedings under universal jurisdiction, if
the person enters Belgium and is arrested, Belgium circumvents a request for
extradition by another State." 9 Thus, it is more convenient for Belgium to arrest a
perpetrator while in the State than it is to initiate extradition proceedings and
involve other States.
The Act has been attacked on three grounds.
2 0 First, Belgium has been acting
as the world's court system for human rights litigation,
2 ' as Belgium is perceived
as ready to lock anyone and everyone up in its jails.
2 2 Second, the Congo
instituted proceedings against Belgium in the International Court of Justice
regarding the arrest warrant Belgium issued for then-Foreign Minister of the
Congo, Yerodia Ndombasi, to determine whether the warrant violates
international law.'23 Finally, it is unclear as to whether the law, in accordance
with international law, can apply to perpetrators not physically present in
Belgium for prosecution.' 24 In July of 2001, Belgium planned to revisit its law on
universal jurisdiction. '2 Discussion of amendments 
will occur in 2002.126
Several solutions to Belgium's problems with the 1999 Act have been
proposed. Belgium is considering the implementation of a "filter" to discourage
the massive amount of suits it is receiving.
27 In addition, Belgian senator
Philippe Mahoux has suggested a change to deny suits against heads of state until
118. See Simons, supra note 106 (indicating Belgium's law may prevent some heads of state from
countries involved in conflict from visiting the headquarters of the European Union in Brussels, which may lead
to negative results).
119. See Luc Reydams, International Decision: Belgian Tribunal of First Instance of Brussels
(Investigating Magistrate), 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 701 (1999) (explaining that a Belgian court has held the Act
to apply to individuals even if they are not present in Belgium, because the legislative intent unambiguously
provides universal jurisdiction in such circumstances).
120. See Rights Groups Support Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law (Nov. 26, 2001), at http://www.
fidh.org/communiq/2001/cu261 la.pdf (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (indicating that Human
Rights Watch, the International Commission of Jurists, and the International Federation of Human Rights
Leagues support Belgium's Act and urge Belgium not to weaken its legislation regarding universal jurisdiction).
121. See id. (arguing that if more States adopted a similar type of legislation providing for the exercise
of universal jurisdiction, it would alleviate the burden on the courts in Belgium to decide all human rights
violation cases).
122. See Hand, supra note 117.
123. See Rights Groups Support Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law, supra note 120.
124. See id. (explaining that "[i]n the cases against Sharon and the DRC minister, an appeals court will
hear arguments.., that the law cannot apply to defendants who are not on Belgian soil").
125. See Wrong Case Against Sharon Folly: Unilateral Posturing on Human Rights Only Undermines
International Law, BALT. SUN, July 9, 2001, at 8A (discussing the embarrassment caused to Belgium for its
application of the 1993 Act to Sharon's activities as Minister of Defense for Israel).
126. See Tyrants Fear Long Arm of Belgian Law, SUNDAY TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.is.lkltimes/0l0805/specrpt.html (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
127. See id. (noting that pressure for the amendment is coming from Belgium's foreign minister, but that
other members of the government have insisted on waiting for serious discussion of amending the 1999 Act
until 2002).
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they leave office.'g Belgium is one of the few States currently allowing
prosecution of sitting heads of state.'29 Thus, allowing sitting heads of state
immunity until after they leave office should decrease the number of suits filed in
Belgium.
2. Spain's Organic Law of the Judicial Power
Spanish law allowing for universal jurisdiction has also undergone evolution
and interpretation.'3 Spain provides for the exercise of universal jurisdiction
under Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power. 3' This provision,
enacted in 1985, grants Spanish courts universal jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity"' as well as those crimes Spain has a duty to prosecute under treaties to
which it is a party. When Spain ratifies a treaty, it is written into its official
publication of laws, thereby making the treaty domestic law3 4 As a part of
Spain's domestic criminal law, Article 23 gives Spain universal jurisdiction over
128. See Hand, supra note 117 (explaining that the Senator views allowing immunity for sitting, but not
former, heads of state as the only option to the problems faced by the law that would not change its function).
129. See id.
130. See Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581,
595 (1999) (examining one of the most recent cases involving the use of universal jurisdiction, which dealt with
Spain's ability to apply its law to a former head of state, Pinochet).
131. Art. 23.4 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power (B.O.E. 1985, 157), available at
http://web.amnesty.orglaidoc/aidoq-pdf.nsf/index/IOR53092
0 9 2ENGLISFY$File/IOR5300901.pdf (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer).
132. See id. (defining crimes against humanity under Spanish law).
The Spanish courts shall... try acts committed abroad by Spaniards or foreigners outside Spanish




c. Piracy and the unlawful capture of aircraft.
d. Falsification of foreign currency.
e. Offenses related to prostitution and the corruption of minors and disabled.
f. Unlawful trafficking of psychotropic, toxic and narcotic drugs.
g. And any other offence which Spain has a duty to prosecute under international
treaties and conventions.
Id.; see also AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 82 (analyzing the laws on universal jurisdiction, country by country,
by looking at four types of legislation allowing for the exercise of universal jurisdiction). The types of
legislation analyzed by Amnesty International include express authorization to exercise universal jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity, universal jurisdiction over ordinary crimes, which may amount to crimes against
humanity, universal jurisdiction over crimes defined or listed in treaties, universal jurisdiction over crimes
under customary international law or general principles of customary international law, and direct incorporation
of international law. Id. at 1-3.
133. See Redress, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe, at http://www. redress.orglannex.html (last visited
Jan. 24, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lmvyer) (describing Spain's domestic legislation on
jurisdiction, including universal jurisdiction provided for in Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Judicial
Power).
134. See id.
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crimes proscribed by the treaties it ratifies. ' For example, as a party to the
Torture Convention, Article 23 confers to Spain the power to exercise universal
jurisdiction over perpetrators of torture under its domestic law."'
Spain's power to exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide, torture, and
terrorism under Article 23 has been upheld by its highest court, the Audiencia
Nacional. 3 ' The Audiencia Nacional was confronted with two cases in 1998
arising from events in Chile and Argentina."" The court determined that Spain
had universal jurisdiction in both cases because it ratified and wrote the Geneva
Conventions into its official publication of laws,'39 allowing it to assert
jurisdiction under Article 23 . Once the court found Spain had universal
jurisdiction in the cases, it addressed whether universal jurisdiction under Article
23 could apply retroactively. 4' Spain's ability to exercise universal jurisdiction
retroactively under Article 23 is important, because if the law cannot apply
retroactively, Spain does not have universal jurisdiction over acts committed
prior to 1985. 42 For example, the events in Chile for which Spain attempted to
exercise universal jurisdiction were committed between 1973 and 1990.143 If
Spain's law cannot be applied retroactively, charges could only be brought for
crimes committed during the last five years. Because the exercise of universal
jurisdiction is considered a procedural law,'" the Court determined it was
applicable to acts committed before the law came into existence.'
45 Therefore,





138. See generally Julia K. Boyle, The International Obligation to Prosecute Human Right Violators:
Spain's Jurisdiction Over Argentine Dirty War Participants, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 187, 188
(1998) (discussing the events occurring in Argentina that resulted in the torture and deaths of thousands of
people during a seven year period of extreme military rule).
139. Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention], available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu3lb/p-genoci.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
140. See Redress, supra note 133.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Pizochet Goes Home to New Legal Climate Though Ex-Dictator has been Allowed to Leave
Britain, Ruling Lets Spain, Other Nations Indict Him for Torture, AUGUSTA CHRON., Mar. 3, 2000, at A13,
available at 2000 WL 14037307 (indicating that Pinochet was charged with acts committed during his entire
seventeen year rein as dictator of Chile).
144. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1221 (explaining that procedural laws "prescribe
the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or
duties themselves").
145. See Redress, supra note 133.
146. See id.
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The first successful Spanish use of universal jurisdiction under Article 23
came via a ruling by the British courts in 1999.4' Spain issued an extradition
warrant for Augusto Pinochet for torture and conspiracy to commit torture during
his seventeen years as a leader in Chile. 148 The use of universal jurisdiction was
necessary because some of the charges against Pinochet were not limited to acts
against Spanish victims. 49 Because the extradition of Pinochet from Britain to
Spain was sought under the Torture Convention,50 an international treaty, it
constituted an exercise of universal jurisdiction by Spain under Article 23.'' The
Torture Convention requires signatory States to either prosecute individuals in
violation of the treaty or to extradite these individuals to a State that will
prosecute them.52 British courts held hearings to determine whether Spain had
universal jurisdiction to try Pinochet, thereby giving rise to Britain's duty to
extradite.'53 The British courts "determined that the Spanish courts had
147. See Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 l.L.M. 581,
595 (1999) (holding Spain had universal jurisdiction over a former head of state); see also Ellen Lutz &
Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin
America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001) (examining the current trend, in the last two decades, of prosecuting
individual violators of human rights crimes and examining the effect of these prosecutions on the occurrence of
human rights violations in those countries whose citizens and leaders have been prosecuted since the influx of
litigation).
148. See T.R. Reid, Too Sick to Stand Trial, Pinochet Back in Chile, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Mar. 3,
2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 7331141 (stating that Pinochet "was arrested in October 1998, while he was
in a London clinic recuperating from back surgery").
149. See Redress, supra note 133 (indicating that Spain issued two warrants for the arrest and extradition
of Pinochet to Spain, and the second warrant included acts against non-Spanish citizens warranting the exercise
of universal jurisdiction).
150. Torture Convention, supra note 44; see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Jan. 31, 2002), at
http:llwww.unhchr.chlpdf/report.pdf (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). Spain (Oct. 21, 1987),
Britain (Dec. 8, 1988) and Chile (Sept. 30, 1988) are all parties to the Torture Convention. Id.
151. See Crossing Borders in the Name of International Human Rights, CANBERRA TIMES, Aug. 28,
2001, at P9, available at 2001 WL 26511302 (indicating that jurisdiction is in the process of evolving and
transcending territorial barriers beginning with Nuremberg and Tokyo in 1945 and continuing into current times
with the tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
152. See Torture Convention, supra note 44, at art. 7. Art. 7 states:
Article 7. 1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to
have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases
contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of an
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. In the cases referred
to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and
conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases
referred to in article 5, paragraph 1.
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any of the
offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the
proceedings.
Id.
153. See Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 147, at 1-2 (stating that "the British courts assiduously considered
the jurisdictional issues posed by the Spanish request"). The question of Spain's ability to exercise universal
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jurisdiction to try Pinochet for crimes committed in Chile over a decade
before."' 154 The British courts' recognition of Spain's authority to exercise
universal jurisdiction demonstrates the legitimacy of the use of universal
jurisdiction by the international community.'55 In addition, the successful
application of Spain's universal jurisdiction law "created a real momentum in
favor of the criminal prosecution of egregious human-rights abuses,"' 5 6 renewing
interest in the use of universal jurisdiction by other States.'
57
III. THE CHALLENGES: IMMUNITY AND AMNESTY
Immunity and amnesty are two major obstacles to the effective exercise of
universal jurisdiction and must be eliminated in order for the system to work
properly. The Twenty-First Century has marked the beginning of substantial
worldwide litigation concerning whether immunity and amnesty are valid
defenses to universal jurisdiction. These issues must be resolved before
prosecution and investigation of crimes falling under the auspices of universal
jurisdiction are allowed to proceed because they contribute to the postponement
of a victim's right to justice.5 ' Allowing leaders of States to claim immunity or
amnesty based solely on their status encourages heads of state to break the jus
cogens59 of international law and escape prosecution.
jurisdiction was due to Pinochet's claim of immunity because he was the former head of state of Chile. Id.; see
also Torture Convention, supra note 44, at art. 7 (indicating that because Britain was also a party to the Torture
Convention at the time Pinochet was in its custody awaiting extradition to Spain, Britain could have prosecuted
Pinochet under its laws).
154. Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 147, at I (discussing the importance of the British courts' decision on
the role of universal jurisdiction in the future, especially with regard to State leaders). The British courts
ultimately found that Pinochet did not have the capacity to stand trial, allowed him to return to Chile, and
escape prosecution in Spain. Id. However, the decision that Spain had jurisdiction to try a former head of state
for crimes occurring outside its borders and to which Spain had no ties is important to Spain's ability to exercise
universal jurisdiction and is discussed in further detail in Part III. See infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text
(discussing the importance of Britain's decision not to grant immunity to Pinochet as a former head of state for
committing crimes against humanity).
155. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1277 (indicating that recognition under
international law is "official action by a country acknowledging, expressly or by implication .... the legality of
the existence of a... situation").
156. Jose de Cordoba, Mexico Allows Extradition of Former Argentine Officer, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
2001, at A19 (quoting the written statement of Jose Miguel Vivanco, executive director of the Americas
division of Human Rights Watch, in the context of the effect of the Pinochet prosecution on Mexico's
extradition of former Argentine navy lieutenant, Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, to Spain for prosecution). "It is the
first time in Latin America 'that we have seen a case where someone who committed the most serious crimes in
one country, and is being prosecuted in a second country, has a third country cooperating in his extradition."'
Id.
157. See id.
158. See Press Release, supra note 9 (stating that "the resulting investigation [of Ariel Sharon in
Belgium] was suspended by the investigating magistrate in early September 2001 until doubts about the legal
validity of the procedure were resolved" because Sharon is fighting the charges on grounds of immunity).
159. See Jordon, supra note 36, at 9 (explaining that jus cogens, with regard to universal jurisdiction,
stands for the proposition that there is no excuse for violating certain human rights, and a person or State may
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From a time when individuals were barely 'subjects' of international law,
governments now have affirmative obligations toward all persons within and
without their territory, during war and peace; and the importance of these
obligations has served to raise the violation of some of them to include criminal
responsibility of offenders."W
A. Immunity
Immunity is the ability of a State official to escape prosecution for crimes for
which he would otherwise be held accountable. 61 Traditionally, immunity has
been grounded in the principle of state sovereignty." State sovereignty rests on
the notion that "[fjor one state to be compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of
another is offensive to the 'dignity' of that state."16  States were viewed as
independent and interference with other states' actions was seen as a sign of
disrespect that would erode international relations. 6' Individuals acting as heads
of state were granted immunity because under State sovereignty, interference
with the performance of their official duties was tantamount to interference with
the State itself.' 5 Thus, removing a leader from the State he governs, in order to
prosecute him, breached the prosecuting State's duty to respect State sovereignty.
In 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia' 6
held that "sovereign rights of states cannot and should not take precedence over
the right of the international community to act appropriately as [crimes against
humanity] affect the whole of mankind and shock the conscience of all nations of
the world."' 67 Immunity has been progressively viewed as a barrier to post-
be held accountable even if the State objects to the crime under international customary law).
160. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 9.
161. See BLACK'S LAW DICTtONARY, supra note 23, at 752-53 (defining the term immunity as "any
exemption from a duty, liability, or service of process; esp., such an exemption granted to a public official").
162. See Pierson, supra note 71, at 269(examining the development of state immunity in light of the
Pinochet case). "[T]he practical justification for state immunity is that immunity promotes respect among states
and helps preserve the smooth functioning of international relations. Reciprocity is key. The forum state grants
immunity to other states so that they in turn will respect the immunity of the forum state." Id.
163. Id. at 269-70.
164. See id. (discussing the development of head of state immunity as relatively recent and derived from
the evolution of state sovereignty into state immunity and, finally, into immunity for heads of state).
165. See id. (noting that "[s]overeignty's essence is that there be no authority higher than the state (par
in parem non habet imperium)").
166. See United Nations, Job Opportunities, at http:llwww.un.orglicty/jobs/jobs/htm (last visited March
18, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia was "created to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of International
Humanitarian Law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 and as a response to the threat to
international peace and security posed by those serious threats").
167. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32, 52 (1995). "It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the
universal need for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against
human rights." Id. State sovereignty was created as a defense to the protection of independent political acts of
the States. Il However, human rights abuses are so universally offensive and undermine the very reason for the
creation of state sovereignty that the defense of immunity cannot stand. Id.
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conflict peace and stability. 6 In addition, Britain's highest court held in 2000'69
that because international law proscribes crimes against humanity, then sovereign
immunity traditionally granted to former heads of state had been abolished. "
However, it may require more than a few domestic court decisions to end
immunity.' 7' Uniformity in the position against immunity worldwide, by domestic
courts, international tribunals, and the future international criminal court, is
required to abolish claims of immunity.
72
There is significant controversy surrounding the ability of States to exercise
jurisdiction over sitting heads of state.' 73 On one side, human rights groups argue
heads of state should not be immune from prosecution during their term in
office. 74 Human Rights Watch, the International Commission of Jurists, and the
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues advocate that "tyrants and
torturers" should not be able to use their positions to shield themselves from
prosecution.' 7' At a minimum, these groups, as well as the drafters of The
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, argue the defense of immunity
should cease once a person has left office, thereby allowing prosecution for acts
committed during the individual's term in office. 
76
168. See Akhavan, supra note 79, at 28 (giving as an example of the ineffectiveness of impunity as a
measure designed to gain peace and stability, the amnesty granted to the RUF by the government of Sierra
Leone in the 1999 Lome Agreement for crimes including widespread killing, rape and torture). The United
Nations eventually had to come to the aid of the Sierra Leone government and declare that the amnesty granted
under the agreement did not apply to international crimes. Id.
169. Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, [200011 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581, 594-
95 (1999). The House of Lords in Britain handed down the decision. Id.
170. See Bradford Trebech, The Lawvyer's Bookshelf, N.Y. LAW J., Nov. 21, 2000, (reviewing
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (2000)).
171. See Akhavan, supra note 79, at 31.
172. See id. (explaining that in spite of the success of the tribunals, domestic exercise of universal
jurisdiction, and the policies behind the future international criminal court, impunity and the commission of
serious human rights violations has not even come close to eradication).
173. See Macan-Markar, supra note 108 ("The notion that criminal charges could be filed against a
serving government leader, like Sharon, under universal jurisdiction remains extremely controversial...").
174. See Rights Groups Support Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law, supra note 120; see also Mark
E. Wojcik, Cris Revaz & Lois A. Gochnauer, International Hunian Rights, 34 INT'L LAW. 761, 763-64 (2000)
(indicating that the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia was "believed to be the first international attempt to prosecute a sitting head of state for human
rights violations").
175. See Rights Groups Support Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law, supra note 120 (voicing support
for Belgium's law on universal jurisdiction, which does not allow heads of state to make claims of diplomatic
immunity to escape prosecution for human rights atrocities, because Belgium's law is under consideration by its
government for amendment with respect to this issue).
176. See id. (indicating that Human Rights Watch, the International Commission of Jurists, and the
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues believe that immunity should never be a defense to
prosecution under universal jurisdiction); see also Wojcik, Revaz & Gochnauer, supra note 174, at 762-63
(explaining that although Pinochet ultimately escaped liability due to health problems, the House of Lords
found that a former head of state has no immunity for the crime of torture under universal jurisdiction, although
the Torture Convention may have played an important role in this determination). But see THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 11, 49 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001), available at http:/www.
princeton.edu/-lapa/unive-jur.pdf. [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES] (copy on file with The Transnational
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In opposition, Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State and National
Security Advisor for the United States,77 argues that stripping heads of state of
immunity from prosecution is "quite new."'7s He ultimately concludes that
drafters of the international human rights treaties never contemplated the use of
universal jurisdiction for the extradition of individual leaders to third party States
for prosecution. 79 Conceding the decision regarding Pinochet was landmark,
Kissinger advances the argument that procedural safeguards are necessary to
ensure that universal jurisdiction cannot be used to settle political vendettas.'
Kissenger's concerns with the use of universal jurisdiction lie in the lack of
procedural safeguards and the interference with the sovereignty of other States.'8 '
1. Immunity for Sitting Heads of State
Belgium's domestic law on universal jurisdiction is at the forefront of
litigation concerning immunity. 2 Belgian courts recognize the need to hold
leaders responsible for human rights violations accountable. Belgium has
increasingly been used as a forum for filing charges against persons under
universal jurisdiction, despite claims of immunity.' s3 Belgium has been involved
in the prosecution of several sitting heads of state through the exercise of
universal jurisdiction.'s 4 Only a minority of States, like Belgium, do not
acknowledge immunity for sitting heads of state under universal jurisdiction, thus
Lawyer) (citing Lord Browne-Wilkinson's dissent from the Princeton Principles). "[F]ear of... legal actions
would inhibit the use of peacekeeping forces when it is otherwise desirable and also the free interchange of
diplomatic personnel." Id. Lord Browne-Wilkinson was the sole dissenter, of thirty participants, from the
adoption of the Principles. Id. at 59-61.
177. See Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2001, at
89 (addressing his views on the use of universal jurisdiction in an essay adapted from his book, DOES AMERICA
NEED FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY); see also Doug Cassel, The World
Reaches Out for Justice, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 2001, at C1 (summarizing Kissinger's arguments against
universal jurisdiction as threatening "to subvert amnesties granted for national reconciliation, to extradite and
detain statesmen like common criminals before they have an opportunity to defend themselves, and then to
prosecute them for ill-defined crimes under unfair procedures").
178. Kissinger, supra note 177.
179. See HENRY KISSiNGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR
THE 21sT CENTURY 275 (2001) (postulating that "[t]he drafters almost certainly believed that they were stating
general principles, not laws that would be enforced by national courts). "For example, Eleanor Roosevelt, one
of the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, referred to it as a 'common standard."' Id.
180. See id.
181. See generally id, at 273-82 (discussing the use of universal jurisdiction by States, tribunals, and the
future International Criminal Court).
182. See Redress, supra note 133 (indicating that Belgium's law on universal jurisdiction expressly
allows application of its law to all persons, regardless of claims of immunity based on official capacity).
183. See Simons, supra note 106 (illustrating Belgium's propensity to prosecute individuals claiming
immunity for human rights violations regardless of whether other States would also allow suit).
184. See Cassel, supra note 177 (addressing the recent increase in the application of universal
jurisdiction by Belgium, which has provoked the Belgian government to reconsider the law and has caused
Belgium to be sued before the International Court of Justice by the Democratic Republic of the Congo for
Belgium's prosecution of its foreign minister).
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creating an inconsistency in the law. 85
Accounting for the lack of uniformity in universal jurisdiction concerning
immunity is made clear by considering examples of prosecution where the
defense has been raised. These examples illustrate the type of acts committed by
heads of state deserving punishment, and not immunity. In April 2000, Belgium
began the prosecution of Yerodia Ndombasi, who was acting as the Congo's
Foreign Minister at the time the arrest warrant was issued. 86 The arrest warrant
charged Ndombasi with war crimes and crimes against humanity for making
"certain speeches in the Congo in August 1998 representing an incitement to
racial hatred."'' s7 These speeches "are said to have resulted in several hundred
deaths, the internment of Tutsis, summary executions, arbitrary arrests and unfair
trials."' 88 After learning Ndombasi had been shifted to an education minister, the
International Court of Justice 89 refused to grant an emergency order to annul the
arrest warrant under the Pinochet holding.'" The Pinochet court held former
185. See Simons, supra note 106 (discussing the reasons behind the large number of suits that are
brought in Belgium under universal jurisdiction versus other States that also have laws allowing the exercise of
universal jurisdiction).
186. See Cassel, supra note 177 (explaining that the case arose from Ndombasi's statements declaring
that "the 'vermin' and 'microbes must be methodically eradicated' during the invasion of the Congo by the
Tutsi-dominated government of Rwanda); see also Belgium Presses Case Against Ex-DR Congo Minister
Before ICJ, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25041085 (noting that Belgium
asked the World Court to find that Ndombasi did not have immunity when he was in office and he "issued a
public appeal for the 'eradication and the crushing of the Rwandan and Ugandan invaders,' whom he described
as 'microbes'). Belgium argued that there was no legal issue because Ndombasi no longer holds a ministerial
position). Id.
187. Press Statement, Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (Feb. 14, 2002), available at
http:llwww.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
188. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketliCOBElicobe-
ijudgment_20020214.PDF (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
189. See Press Release, International Court of Justice, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v.
Belgium), Conclusion of the Public Hearings, Court Ready to Consider Its Judgment (Oct. 19, 2001), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress200l-27_cobe_200 11019.1 (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (noting that oral arguments have been heard by both sides and the court is ready to
consider its judgment as to whether Belgium can exercise universal jurisdiction over Ndombasi under the 1993
Act because he was a sitting head of state at the time the arrest warrant was issued); see also International Court
of Justice, Foreword, available at http://www. icjcij.org/icjwww/igen.. .formation/ibbook/Bbookforeword.
HTM (last visited Nov. 5, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (indicating that the International
Court of Justice sits as a world court to decide legal disputes based on international law brought by States, and
to issue advisory opinions for international organizations and agencies).
190. See Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 58 1,
591-95 (1999) (limiting its holding to the fact that Pinochet was a former head of state, was physically present
in Britain at the time of his arrest, would be present in Spain for trial upon extradition by Britain, and the
Torture Convention specifically gave Spain, Britain, and Chile jurisdiction to prosecute any violators under it
because they were all parties to the treaty); see also Cassel, supra note 177 (indicating that the factors
determined by the court in the Pinochet case that gave Spain universal jurisdiction are not present in Belgium's
prosecution of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon). As Prime Minister, Sharon is a sitting head of state, he is
not physically present in Belgium and no treaty specifically authorizes universal jurisdiction for the alleged
crimes. Id.
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heads of state are not entitled to immunity from universal jurisdiction. 9' As
education minister, Ndombasi was no longer a sitting head of state; therefore, he
was no longer entitled to immunity under the Pinochet holding.'92 Because he was
no longer a head of state, there was no need for the International Court of Justice
to immediately consider whether to deny Belgium universal jurisdiction over
Ndombasi.'93 However, when the International Court of Justice decided the case,
it based its decision on Ndombasi's position at the time the arrest warrant was
issued.' 9 Analyzing sitting head of state immunity under customary international
law, the International Court of Justice held that heads of state enjoy immunity
from universal jurisdiction during their term in office.' 95 The Court established
that immunities are given to heads of state "to ensure the effective performance
of their functions on behalf of their respective States."' 96 Heads of state, solely by
the nature of their position, are recognized in the ifiternational community as
persons with the authority to act and to communicate on behalf of the State.
97
These positions often require heads of state to travel to other States without
restriction.'98 Thus, heads of state enjoy full immunity from prosecution under
universal jurisdiction during their term in office in order to avoid impeding the
performance of the official functions of the State.'" The Court ultimately ordered
Belgium to cancel its arrest warrant for Ndombasi because it violated
international law at the time the warrant was issued.2°t
In June of 2001, the Belgium court sat for the prosecution of Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon, a sitting head of state.2t" Sharon was charged with
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, including the murder,
torture, rape and disappearance of hundreds to thousands of Lebanese and
191. See Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581,
595 (1999).
192. See Belgium Presses Case Against Ex-DR Congo Minister Before ICJ, supra note 186.
193. See Press Release, supra note 192 (indicating that Belgium was not automatically denied universal
jurisdiction over Ndombasi because he was formerly a head of state).
194. See Case Concerning the Arrest Wan-ant of 11 April 2000, supra note 188 ("The question
submitted to the Court for decision remains whether the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant by the
Belgian judicial authorities against a person who was at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo
were contrary to international law").
195. Id. Once a head of state leaves office, he may be prosecuted for acts, subject to universal




199. Id. at 209. The Court emphasized that immunity from prosecution, under universal jurisdiction,
does not exonerate the individual from criminal responsibility, but only delays the ability to prosecute him until
he no longer has official duties to perform on behalf of the State. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Herb Keinon, Sharon Meets With His Belgian Lawyers, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 17, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 6615187 (examining the argument by Sharon's lawyers that the Belgium court does not
have jurisdiction because leaders of States have immunity from prosecution for violations of the Geneva war
crimes convention).
.383
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Palestinian men, women and children.2  Sharon's actions allegedly occurred
while Sharon was the Minister of Defense for Israel . 3 In his capacity as Minister
of Defense, Sharon directed Israel's invasion of Lebanon and sent Christian
Phalange militia into Beirut's refugee camps with the knowledge that the militia
was likely to commit atrocities.2 4 Sharon's attorneys argued that Belgium's law
on universal jurisdiction does not allow the stripping of Sharon's immunity as a
head of state.205 The Belgian appeals court's ability to determine whether the
State's 1999 Act can reject immunity for sitting heads of state was pre-empted by
the International Court of Justice's decision in the Ndombasi case, Concerning
the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000.2o The International Court of Justice held
that one State's leader has immunity from the universal jurisdiction of another
State during his term in office, absent a waiver of immunity by the leader's
State .20  Therefore, in order to avoid a violation of international law, Belgium
cannot exercise universal jurisdiction over Sharon unless Israel consents to the
prosecutioN. Because Sharon is Israel's Prime Minister, it is unlikely Israel will
consent to Belgium's prosecution of Sharon.0 8 Thus, Sharon may go unpunished
for these crimes until the end of his term in office.
Ten Cuban exiles indicted President Fidel Castro for human rights violations,
including murder and torture, in Belgium under the 1993 Act.2O As President of
202. See Press Release, Chibli Mallat, Lead Attorney for Sabra and Shatila Survivors in Beirut, Mallat
Law Offices, Case Opened Against a Head of State for War Crimes (June 22, 2001), available at http://groups.
yahoo.comlgroup/elntifada/message/32 (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (specifying the details of
the complaint filed in Belgium on June 18, 2001 against Sharon, arising from his position as Minister of
Defense of Israel, when he was in Beirut, in contact with field commanders, and gave orders to Philange
leadership resulting in their entering the camps in September of 1982 and causing atrocious human rights
violations and massacres); see also supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text (detailing the events that occurred
leading up to the charges filed against Sharon).
203. See The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights & the Environment, supra note 8
(presenting the translation of the complaint against Sharon filed by three Belgium lawyers on behalf of 23
plaintiffs). The complaint states the facts giving rise to charges for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes, Belgium's jurisdictional basis for prosecution, and individual statements of personal suffering
by the surviving victims of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. Id.
204. See Gershom Gorenberg, Damned Spot, JERUSALEM REP., July 30, 2001, at 17 (examining the
effects of reopening the atrocities committed under the direction of Ariel Sharon when Sharon was the Minister
of Defense for Israel). "[D]redging up an affair buried 19 years in Sharon's past was meant as an assault on
Israel's elected leader, on Israel itself." Id.
205. See Gray, supra note 19 (indicating that the issue of Ariel Sharon's immunity from suit in Belgium
is pending in a Belgium appeals court, and until a decision is rendered the investigation of Sharon has been
temporarily suspended).
206. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 188; see also Sharon
Hearings Close in Belgium, supra note 20 (indicating that that the Belgian court is expected to determine
whether the Sharon case is admissible in late February or early March of 2002).
207. Id.
208. See Gorenberg, supra note 204 (discussing Belgium's charges against Sharon as tantamount to an
attack on the State of Israel itself).
209. See Castro to be Indicted in Belgium, DE STANDAARD, Oct. 4, 2001, available at 2001 WL
4758203 (reporting plans for Castro to be indicted in Belgium under a controversial law providing for
prosecution of "foreigners" for war crimes and human rights offenses committed outside Belgium); see also
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Cuba, Castro is also a sitting head of state. The petition was filed in Belgium on
October 3, 2001 charging Castro with crimes against humanity.21 The alleged
incidents resulted in the deaths of forty-five people.21' If convicted, Castro faces
212up to thirty years in prison. Another case filed under Belgium's 1993 Act was
against Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat for committing crimes against
humanity,213 including torture, genocide, and murder.214 The complaint, filed by
the Terror Victims Association, a group of Israelis, cites crimes dating back to
197415 and asserts that twenty-three people were killed and six people were
wounded.21s
However, the holding in Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
will permit Ndombasi, Sharon, Castro, and Arafat to escape prosecution under
universal jurisdiction until they leave office, unless their respective States waive
immunity.2 7 It is unlikely that a State will waive immunity in order for one of its
Cuba: Cuban Exiles Bring Charges Against President Fidel Castro in Belgian Court, NOTICEN: CENT. AM. &
CARIBBEAN AFF., Oct. 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10208933 (mentioning the complaint brought in a
Belgian court by nine Cuban exiles under the 1993 Act against the Cuban President, Armed Forces Minister,
and two army generals for alleged crimes against humanity). The incidents consist of the grnning down of two
planes and the sinking of a tugboat, resulting in a total of forty-five deaths. Id.
210. See Lloyd Grove Washington, The Reliable Source, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2001, at C03 (reporting
that Larry Klayman, the attorney for the ten exiles, arrived in Brussels on October 3, 2001 to file a petition
against Castro); see also Cuba: Cuban Exiles Bring Charges Against President Fidel Castro in Belgian Court,
supra note 209 (indicating that the charges for crimes against humanity, including allegations of murder,
torture, and other criminal offenses were the result of two key incidents). Specifically, Castro was charged with
ordering Cuban fighter interceptors to shoot down two planes near the Cuban coast and the Cuban coast guard
to ram a tugboat, sinking it. IL
211. See Cuba: Cuban Exiles Bring Charges Against President Fidel Castro in Belgian Court, supra
note 209 (indicating that four people were killed when the two planes were gunned down and forty-one people
were killed when the tugboat sank, consisting of people fleeing Cuba for the United States).
212. See Castro Charged With Committing Crimes Against Humanity, NEwSMAx, Oct. 5, 2001, at
http:llwww.newsmax.comlarchivelprint.shtml?a2001/10151223326 (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (documenting the suit filed in Belgium by Judicial Watch, a public interest firm, against Castro).
213. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Arafat and Sharon in Belgian Court Fights, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Nov. 29, 2001, at 19 (stating that the fight in the Belgian courts concerns the ability of Belgium to
prosecute these leaders despite the immunity that Sharon and Arafat claim); see also Philip Jacobson, Israeli
Terror Victims Sue Arafat Under Belgian War Crime Law, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 23, 2001, at
28 (discussing the similarity of the Arafat legal action and the Sharon proceedings already underway). Also,
adding that "[t]he tactics being used by Mr Sharon's high-powered defen[s]e team, run from Israel's justice
ministry, may help Mr Arafat," because "the lawyers are arguing that under any reasonable interpretation of the
Belgian law, the courts have no jurisdiction to hear the case because the accused is not on Belgian territory." Id.
214. See Hand, supra note 117 (discussing the complaint made by the Terror Victim's Association
against Arafat in Belgium).
215. See Israelis File Complaint Against Arafat in Belgium, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at 5
(indicating that a suit was brought by thirty Israeli members of the Terror Victims Association for genocide of
Jewish people over the last three decades).
216. Hand, supra note 117.
217. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 188 (holding that heads of
state enjoy full immunity during their term in office). There are four situations where international law will
allow the prosecution of heads of state. Id. There is no immunity from prosecution by the leader's own State in
accordance with its domestic laws. Id. There is no immunity from prosecution under universal jurisdiction
where the State the leader represents waives immunity. Id. Once a person leaves office, he no longer enjoys
385
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leaders to be prosecuted by another State. -8 Sitting heads of state are often the
persons with enough power to commit such atrocities, yet escape punishment.
2,9
If universal jurisdiction allows the majority of perpetrators to escape justice
because of their positions of power, then the international community is
essentially condoning the atrocities committed by heads of state. 20 Universal
jurisdiction is powerless if those at the top of command are permitted to give
22!
orders without repercussions.
2. Immunity for Former Heads of State
British courts are at the forefront for denial of immunity for acts committed
by sitting heads of state.222 When Spain requested that Great Britain arrest and
extradite General Augusto Pinochet, the decision ended up in the hands of
223
Britain's highest court. Pinochet was charged in Spain for committing torture
and conspiracy to commit torture during his dictatorship of Chile from 1973 to
1990.224 The House of Lords considered whether Pinochet was entitled to
immunity. Id. Certain international criminal courts may assert jurisdiction pursuant to resolutions under the
United Nations Charter and the Rome Statute. Id.
218. See Pierson, supra note 71, at 269-70 (explaining that immunity is grounded in the principles of
state sovereignty, meaning that States must respect each other's independence in return for reciprocity).
219. See Akhavan, supra note 79 (explaining that heads of state need to be held accountable for their
actions, although heads of state have often been able to escape punishment for their criminal actions under the
precepts of immunity).
220. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 203-42 (discussing the issue of immunity in relation to
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity). "When someone kills a man, he is put in prison. When
someone kills twenty people, he is declared mentally insane. But when someone kills 200,000 people, he is
invited to Geneva for peace negotiations.' Sarajevo joke, circa 1994." Id.
221. See id.
222. See Anita C. Johnson, The Extradition Proceedings Against General Augusto Pinochet: Is Justice
being Met Under International Law?, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 204 (2000) (reviewing the proceeding
against General Augusto Pinochet by the House of Lords in Britain).
By recognizing the importance of universal jurisdiction, the British courts helped to set
the standard that there could be prosecution of "dictators and leaders of repressive
regimes by courts in countries where the alleged abuses did not occur." Furthermore, the
British courts set another precedent by not granting immunity for former heads of state
when charged with crimes against humanity committed under their command.
Id.
223. See Chile's Chance, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2000, at B6 (explaining the decision of British
authorities finding Pinochet too sick to stand trial in Spain).
224. See Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century. The Jurisprudence of Death at the
Dawn of the New Millennium, 23 HouS. J. INT'L L. 467, 517-20 (2001) (discussing Spain's 1985 law on
universal jurisdiction allowing prosecution for crimes of genocide and other related human rights violations).
"The Pinochet decision has been described as the first time that a local domestic court has refused to afford
immunity to a head of state or to a former head of state on the grounds that such immunity does not extend to
the perpetrators of severe international crimes." Id.; see also Pinochet Goes Home to New Legal Climate
Though Ex-Dictator has been Allowed to Leave Britain, Ruling Lets Spain, Other Nations Indict Him for
Torture, supra note 143 (reporting that "[a] Spanish magistrate has indicted [Pinochet] on charges of torture and
conspiracy to torture his political adversaries during the 17 years he ruled Chile as the head of a military
juanta").
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immunity as a former head of state.22 If Pinochet was not immune from
prosecution, Britain would have a duty to extradite him to Spain for
prosecution.2 6 British courts set precedent in this case by "not granting immunity
for former heads of state when charged with crimes against humanity committed
under their command."22' 7 A former head of state cannot claim immunity based on
acts committed while in office that are illegal or beyond the scope of his official
powers.- Because torture became illegal under the Torture Convention, 2 9 and
Chile was a signatory to the treaty, the commission of torture by Pinochet was
not within his official powers. ° The court "held that General Pinochet's claim of
former head of state immunity, a form of diplomatic immunity, was invalid
because torture is not an official act of a head of state."' 32 However, the House of
Lords held that under the same circumstances, a sitting head of state would have
absolute immunity from prosecution.2
While General Augusto Pinochet was held in Britain awaiting extradition to
Spain, Belgium filed separate charges against Pinochet under its 1993 Act. 33
225. See Amber Fitzgerald, The Pinochet Case: Head of State Immunity Within the United States, 22
WHnrrER L. REv. 987, 1000-02 (2001) (discussing the litigation in Spain and Britain concerning the
prosecution and extradition, respectively, of Pinochet in light of its effect on head of state immunity within the
United States). In the United States, the decision to issue immunity for heads of state rests with the suggestion
of the State Department whose decision would undoubtedly be linked to the political repercussions, with regard
to foreign relations with Chile, of denying someone such as Pinochet immunity from prosecution. Id. at 1018.
226. See id. at 1000-02.
227. Johnson, supra note 222, at 204 (discussing that this was accomplished because the British courts
understood the importance of universal jurisdiction); see also Michael Caplan, The Legacy Bequeathed by
Pinochet, TIMES OF LONDON, Mar. 14, 2000, at LAWI5, available at 2000 WL 2874568 (noting the House of
Lords decision not to allow immunity for former heads of state for crimes under international law).
228. Regina v. Barfle ex parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581, 634-
38 (1999) (separate opinion of Lord Hutton).
229. Torture Convention, supra note 44.
230. See Fitzgerald, supra note 225, at 1002 (indicating that Pinochet, while still head of state of Chile,
is the person that signed the Torture Convention making Chile a party).
231. White, supra note 58, at 209 (explaining how the Pinochet decision sets precedent for not allowing
other leaders to claim diplomatic immunity for crimes against humanity which fall under universal jurisdiction
because these types of acts are not those which the international community recognizes as official acts of a head
of state); see also Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, 38 LL.M. 581, 634-38 (1999) (separate opinion of Lord
Hutton) (examining the issue of whether Pinochet was allowed to claim diplomatic immunity). The court stated:
[IThe issue in the present case is whether Senator Pinochet, as a former head of state can
claim immunity (ratione meteriae) on the grounds that acts of torture committed by him
when he was head of state were done by him in exercise of his functions as head of state.
In my opinion he is not entitled to claim such immunity.
Id.
232. See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, Symposium on Method in International Law: The
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 302, 314-15 (1999) (discussing the reluctance of States "io scrutinize the behavior of other states vis-a-vis
the latter's own population as to bring their own leaders to justice"). The practice of allowing heads of state to
claim immunity once they have left office conflicts with international human rights law "to exclude certain
criminal acts from the legitimate exercise of state functions."
233. See Redress, supra note 133 (describing Belgian cases where the court has applied its domestic
legislation on universal jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for human rights violations covered under its laws).
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There was no armed conflict in Chile at the time Pinochet was being charged
with murder, assault, abduction, torture, and hostage taking, and therefore the
Belgian court could not apply the 1993 Act
34 because, as a codification of the
Geneva Conventions, the Act only covered crimes committed during an armed
conflict.235 Judge Vandermeersch, who presided over the case in Belgium, found
the acts constituted crimes against humanity as condemned under customary
international law, and therefore, Belgium could exercise universal jurisdiction
over Pinochet on those grounds.3 6 Judge Vandermeersch "decided that although
Senator Pinochet was immune from prosecution for all official acts committed in
the exercise of his functions as head of state: '[T]he alleged crimes could not
possibly be considered official acts performed in the normal exercise of the
function as Chief of State, whose task precisely consists in protecting his
subjects.' 237 As a result of the decisions in Britain and in Belgium, it appears
there is no immunity for former heads of state with regard to torture and crimes
against humanity under international law. 3"
Eradicating the defense of immunity for former heads of state is more
compelling than for sitting heads of state.239 Former heads of state no longer have
official duties to perform on behalf of their State. Allowing universal jurisdiction
over former heads of state does not interfere with the functioning of the State,
which is the primary concern of sovereign immunity. Universal jurisdiction is
necessary in these instances because States are hesitant to prosecute their own
former leaders out of fear or respect.
B. Amnesty
For many of the same reasons that immunity must not be allowed, amnesties
must also be eliminated as a defense to universal jurisdiction. Amnesty should
not be a defense because persons will likely commit human rights violations with
234. See id. (setting forth the procedural history of the case in Belgium against General Augusto
Pinochet that eventually led to charges being filed against him for crimes against humanity).
235. Geneva Conventions, supra note 61; see also Redress, supra note 133 (indicating at the time
Belgium charged Pinochet with crimes against humanity, the 1999 Act had not taken effect). As the 1999 Act
stands, it would cover crimes against humanity regardless of whether or not the acts were committed in an
armed conflict. Id.
236. See Redress, supra note 133 (giving "weight to the international consensus that it was the
responsibility of all states to take the necessary measures to repress crimes against humanity"). "[A]s a matter of
customary international law, or even stronger as a matter of jus cogens, universal jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity exists, authorizing national judicial authorities to prosecute and punish the perpetrators in all
circumstances." Id. Crimes against humanity are crimes subject to universal jurisdiction on an international
front, and as a result permits domestic courts to exercise universal jurisdiction. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. C.f Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (indicating that the United States allows judicial
discretion for the determination of whether a suit should be allowed against the President during his term in
office because the victim has the right to receive his day in court; however, the suit should not be allowed if it
will significantly interrupt the President's official duties).
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the expectation of later negotiating out of accountability. Under international law,
the recognition of amnesty as a defense hinges on whether there is a duty to
prosecute the crime under a treaty or customary international law.m The lack of
uniformity concerning amnesty surfaces when this test is applied to crimes
against humanity.
Amnesty occurs when one government agrees not to hold persons liable for
past criminal acts.24' Amnesty constitutes forgiveness and exempts classes of
persons from prosecution, usually in exchange for their agreement to give up
242criminal activities. Amnesty usually occurs in response to a revolution or a civil
war, when the successful side offers it to those defeated.243 There are three
traditional types of amnesties: self-amnesties, transitional amnesties, and post-
conflict amnesties.2 4 Self-amnesties occur when a government passes "amnesty
laws as a means of exonerating themselves or their agents for human rights
violations."' 45 Self-amnesties are invalid as they are tantamount to self-
judgment.2 Transitional amnesties occur when a government grants "amnest[ies]
for acts committed by the state's previous regime," 247 and offers expediency in
the course of a non-violent surrender of power by the former government in
240. See Mendez & Tinajero-Esquivel, supra note 41, at 5,7 (explaining the test that is applied to
determine whether a particular amnesty is going to be respected as a defense to universal jurisdiction).
241. See BLACK'S LAW DICnrONARY, supra note 23, at 83 (defining amnesty as "a pardon extended by
the government to a group or class of persons, usu. for a political offense").
242. See, e.g., COLUMBiA ELECrRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2000), at http://www.encyclopedia.
conrlarticles/00447.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (giving an
example of amnesty: "the United States granted a qualified amnesty to the Confederate forces after the Civil
War").
243. See id.
244. See Karen Gallagher, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra
Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 149, 168-71 (2000) (setting forth the three traditional categories of amnesty
under international law in order to determine whether the amnesty given to Sierra Leone is legal). But see
William W. Burke-White, Refraining Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law to an Analysis of Amnesty
Legislation, 42 HARV. INT'L U.J. 467, 479-517 (2001) (classifying amnesty into four categories: blanket
amnesty; locally legitimized, partial immunity; internationally legitimized, partial immunity; and international
constitutional immunity). Blanket amnesty, generally given by an exiting State official to all State officials for
all acts committed during a specific period of time without international authority, encompasses a broad scope.
Id. at 482. Locally legitimized, partial immunity is more legitimate in that it excludes from its scope common
crimes and crimes committed because of personal motives, but requires that the victims of crimes for which
amnesty is granted have alternative means for obtaining a remedy, such as a civil action. Id. at 493.
Internationally legitimized, partial immunity usually encompasses the same characteristics as locally
legitimized, partial immunity, but has the backing of a "politically significant coalition of states, regional
powers, and/or the international community." Id. at 499. International constitutional immunity requires the
amnesty be granted legitimately under the laws of the State, applies only to those crimes that the state does not
have a duty to prosecute, and the amnesty is approved by the international community. Id. at 510.
245. Gallagher, supra note 244, at 168-69 (giving examples of Argentina and Peru's failed attempts at
granting self-amnesty).
246. See id.
247. Id. at 169-170 (giving the South African amnesty established by the new government, led by
Nelson Mandela, as an example of transitional amnesty allowing a new government to maintain order and keep
peace).
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charge of the State. 241 Post-conflict amnesties occur when a government grants
"amnest[ies] for crimes committed during an internal conflict;"249 these are given
for the sole purpose of ending the conflict and restoring order to the State!
0 The
three traditional types of amnesties are different ways that amnesty can be
granted to persons under various conditions.25 ' The respect given to amnesty by
the international community depends on the type of amnesty granted.
Once a State establishes universal jurisdiction over an individual, the
person's ability to successfully claim the defense of amnesty hinges on whether
2522
international law requires prosecution of the crime. Amnesty laws conflicting
with a State's duty to prosecute offenders of certain crimes under a treaty
25 3 or
customary international law have no legal effect internationally. -4 Where a State
has the duty under a treaty to prosecute or to extradite the perpetrator, amnesty
will not be recognized as a defense.25 5 For example, the Genocide Convention
states "[p]ersons committing genocide or any other act enumerated in Article Ill
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals.25 6 If a State is party to the Genocide Convention,
it must prosecute or extradite the individuals responsible for violating the treaty,
without regard to the defense of amnesty.257 Thus, if a treaty or customary
international law makes the prosecution of a crime mandatory, rather than
permissive, amnesty will fail as a defense to the application of universal
248. See Burke-White, supra note 244, at 467 (indicating that the use of transitional amnesties has
caused a debate to materialize between the goals of peaceful governmental transition and providing
accountability for past crimes).
249. Gallagher, supra note 244, at 170.
250. See id. at 169 (setting forth examples of States that have chosen to exercise this method of amnesty
to include Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Algeria, and to a lesser extent, El Salvador).
251. See Burke-White, supra note 244, at 479-517; see also Gallagher, supra note 244, at 168-71
(illustrating the different situations under which amnesties may be given and the amount of credence that is
given to each one). For purposes of this Comment, amnesty will be discussed generally.
252. See Boed, supra note 41, at 313 (discussing the crimes over which universal jurisdiction is
exercised and the validity of domestic amnesty measures for those crimes under international human rights
law). These crimes include crimes against humanity, the crime of genocide, and the crime of torture. Id.
253. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1507 (defining treaty as "an agreement, league,
or contract between two or more nations or sovereigns, with a view to the public welfare, formally signed by
commissioners properly authorized, and solemnly ratified by the several sovereigns or the supreme power of
each state"). "A treaty is not only a law but also a contract between two nations and must, if possible, be so
construed as to give full force and effect to all its parts." Id.
254. See Mendez & Tinajero-Esquivel, supra note 41, at 5, 7. Argentine's amnesty laws, Obediencia
Debida and Punto Final, were unenforceable in the international community because they are contrary to the
principles enshrined in such international treaties as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, the Convention against
Torture, and the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against
Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance which compel punishment for acts in
violation of their requirements. Id.
255. See id. at 7.
256. Genocide Convention, supra note 139, at art. IV.
257. See Mendez & Tinajero, supra note 263, at 7.
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jurisdiction."5
No treaty directly prescribes a duty to prosecute perpetrators of crimes
against humanity2 9 In addition, it is not clear whether customary international
law creates a duty to punish violators of crimes against humanity.' There is
disagreement among legal scholars concerning the ability of crimes against
humanity to prevent the defense of amnesty.26' Proponents argue the duty to
prosecute or to extradite violators of crimes against humanity is clearly
established in customary international law, as evidenced by the practice of many
States. 2 Others argue the duty to prosecute crimes against humanity is not
established under customary international law because States do not uniformly
recognize it.23 A consensus on whether there is a duty to prosecute crimes against
humanity is necessary to give States the ability to properly evaluate claims of
amnesty by persons charged. Ultimately, this determination should lead to
uniformity among States concerning one of the many controversial aspects of
universal jurisdiction.
C. Immunity and Amnesty Contribute to Lack of Uniformity in the Exercise of
Universal Jurisdiction
Rejecting the defenses of immunity and amnesty is necessary "in the struggle
to defend human rights.,,26 Because State courts are the primary exercisers of
universal jurisdiction, they must act uniformly in denying immunity and amnesty
to perpetrators of serious human rights violations.2 Universal jurisdiction cannot
be used effectively when allowing certain persons, based on their status, to
escape its reach. In regards to serious human rights abuses, one's status as a
258. See Broomball, supra note 40, at 404-06 (discussing the differences between permissive and
mandatory universal jurisdiction).
259. See Boed, supra note 41, at 314. But see M. CHERnF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 221-24 (2d rev. ed. 1999) (arguing that there is a duty to prosecute or extradite
for crimes against humanity at least under customary international law, which is underscored by a United
Nations resolution in 1973, "Principles of International Cooperation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition and
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity").
260. See id. (indicating that genocide and torture are covered by conventions to which States have
become a party and the duty to prosecute seems clear).
261. See id.
262. BASSIOUNI, supra note 259, at 224. States providing universal jurisdiction for crimes against
humanity include, but are not limited to "Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, the United
Kingdom and the United States." Id.
263. See Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 507, 519-20 (1999) (stating that "there is scant evidence that customary
international law requires the prosecution of crimes against humanity" and customary international law must be
the result of "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation").
264. Mary Robinson, Foreword to THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICION, at 15
(Stephen Macedo ed., 2001). Mary Robinson is the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Id.
265. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 82 (discussing the role of the domestic use of universal jurisdiction
to provide accountability by refusing to grant immunity and amnesty to violators of human rights law).
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sitting or former head of state is not an excuse for atrocious actions.266 In fact,
because these leaders hold such high positions of power and their acts affect so
many people, it is necessary for heads of state to be punished in order to deter
others with similar influence. 26' By allowing the defenses of immunity and
amnesty for sitting and former heads of state, States are essentially rendering
universal jurisdiction useless because heads of state are the majority of
261
perpetrators and have the most influence over other's actions.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Uniformity is needed where the application of universal jurisdiction is
concerned, especially with the increase in the domestic application of universal
jurisdiction. Because domestic laws on universal jurisdiction are increasingly
used to prosecute sitting and former heads of state and these domestic laws vary
from State to State, a uniform system of laws for the application of universal
jurisdiction is essential. A uniform system would ensure that no person has the
ability to escape justice for the commission of grave acts, while at the same time
alleviating the burden of mass litigation on the judicial systems of States willing
to prosecute such persons. These solutions include the adoption of uniform
domestic laws on universal jurisdiction and the creation of an international
criminal court, together forming an international criminal justice system.
A. The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
Adoption of The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction by all States
is a viable solution to the lack of uniformity in domestic universal jurisdiction
269
legislation. A group of thirty leading jurists and legal experts in the
international law arena drafted a set of laws to govern the use of universal
jurisdiction entitled The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction ("The
Principles").2 10 The type of jurisdiction 27 promulgated by The Principles is
266. See Press Release, supra note 20 (considering how no person deserves immunity from prosecution
for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).
267. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 203-42 (indicating the difficulty encountered by the
international community applying universal jurisdiction with the goal of deterring future commission of crimes
against humanity).
268. See id. at 207 (stating that crimes against humanity "are distinguished from acts which may have
the same result - murder, torture and the like - by virtue of the fact that they are perpetrated by state officials or
agents systematically and in furtherance of an unlawful policy of denying to political or racial groups the right
to life or physical integrity").
269. See THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 59-61 (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (sponsoring organizations include the Program in Law and Public Affairs and Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, International Commission of Jurists, American
Association for the International Commission of Jurists, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, and Urban
Morgan Institute for Human Rights).
270. See id. at 11-12. William J. Butler and Stephan A. Oxman began this project with a visit to
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universal "jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to
where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged perpetrator, the
nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such
jurisdiction." 27 2 The goal of The Principles is to bring understanding and order to
the concept of universal jurisdiction.273 The Principles are "a progressive
restatement of international law on the subject of universal jurisdiction... not
[to] be understood to limit the future evolution of universal jurisdiction."
274
Moreover, The Principles are "part of an ongoing process taking place in
different countries and involving scholars, researchers, government experts,
international organizations, and other members of international civil society" to
advance "international criminal justice and human rights."275 Richard Falk, one of
the drafters of The Principles and a Professor at Princeton University, has
described The Principles as "the most serious attempt ever made to guide
national courts in meeting the challenge of crimes of state." 27 6 Thus, The
Principles have the potential to provide a uniform system of laws on universal
jurisdiction if adopted by all States.
Closing the gap in the enforcement of international criminal law by creating
and publishing sound laws on universal jurisdiction,27  The Principles are
Princeton University in January 2000, which led to the assembly and meeting of various working groups based
upon expertise in international law, which ultimately resulted in their publication in May 2001. Id.
271. See Broomhall, supra note 40, at 403 (contrasting territorial or protective principle jurisdiction and
active or passive personality jurisdiction). Territorial or protective principle jurisdiction allows jurisdiction over
a crime occurring within or having an apparent impact on the State's territory or security. Id. Active or passive
personality jurisdiction permits jurisdiction even when the perpetrator or victim of the crime has no connection
to the crime or the state prosecuting the crime. Id.; see also Cassel, supra note 32, at 432-33 (indicating that
jurisdictional basis allowed by international law, although only one is needed to prosecute, include universal
jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, nationality jurisdiction, passive personality jurisdiction, and protective
jurisdiction).
Universal jurisdiction is exercised when the prosecuting State has no connection to the perpetrator, the
victim, or the crime, Id. When a State is a direct target of a crime, because either it occurred there or has a direct
effect on it, the State can exercise territorial jurisdiction. I. A State exercises nationality jurisdiction over its
citizens when the crime occurs elsewhere, I. Passive personality jurisdiction allows a State to prosecute
perpetrators where the victim of the crime is a citizen of that State. Id. Finally, if the crime affects the State's
sovereign interests, it may exercise protective jurisdiction. Id.
272. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 28 (defining Principle I of The Princeton Principles of
Universal Jurisdiction).
273. See id. at 11 (emphasizing that this is "an increasingly important area of international criminal law:
prosecutions for serious crimes under international law in national courts based on universal jurisdiction, absent
traditional links to the victims or perpetrators of crimes").
274. hd. at 39 (explaining why The Principles were drafted and the flexibility that was drafted into them
to allow for future evolution of The Principles as problems arise).
275. Id. at 26 (introducing The Principles and their purpose).
276. Jeff Milgram, University-Led Panel Eyes World Crime, PRINCETON PACKET, July 24, 2001,
available at http:llwww.pacpubserver.comlnew/newsn7-24-Ol/crime.html (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (discussing the drafting and adoption of The Principles).
277. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 24 (noting that by filling the gap in application of
universal jurisdiction, The Principles "should help to punish, and thereby to deter and prevent, the commission
of heinous crimes").
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designed to be useful to legislators seeking to ensure that national laws conform
to international law, to judges called upon to interpret and to apply international
law and to consider whether national law conforms to their state's international
legal obligations, to government officials of all kinds exercising their power
under both national and international law, to nongovernmental organizations and
members of civil society active in the promotion of international criminal justice
and human rights, and to citizens who wish to better understand what
international law is and what the international legal order might become..2 78 The
Principles compose a model statute that the drafters hope to persuade States to
adopt:279
1. Relevant Provisions of The Principles
In addition to creating uniformity in the use of universal jurisdiction
generally, The Principles address immunity and amnesty as defenses to universal
jurisdiction. The Principles distinguish between procedural and substantive
210immunity. Under customary international law, procedural immunity allows
sitting heads of state "immunity during their term [in] office. 28' Substantive
immunity allows exoneration from punishment for heads of state for criminal
acts "committed in an official capacity. ' , 2 Because The Principles only recognize
procedural immunity as a defense, The Principles allow prosecution of sitting
heads of state after their term in office ends.283 The Principles provide for the type
of temporary immunity considered by the Belgian Government. 28 The Principles'
stance on immunity is in accordance with state sovereignty as established under
285international law.
278. Id. at 26 (setting forth the purposes for which the Princeton Principles were drafted).
279. See War-crimes Fugitives are Plan's Target, SEATrLE TIMES, July 23, 2001, at A8 (stating that
"[dirafters of the principles will encourage nations to adopt them" because there are currently no effective
means to ensure accountability of persons committing gross human rights violations, and the international
tribunals have limited jurisdiction).
280. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 48.
281. Id. at 50.
282. Id. at 48.
283. See id. at 48-51 (describing substantive versus procedural immunity for sitting heads of state). "A
substantive immunity from prosecution would provide heads of state, diplomats, and other officials with
exoneration from criminal responsibility for the commission of serious crimes under international law when
these crimes are committed in an official capacity." Id. at 48. "[Plrocedural immunity remains in effect during a
head of state's or other official's tenure in office, or during the period in which a diplomat is accredited to a host
state." Id. at 49. The Principles reject the concept of substantive immunity. Id.; see also Cassel, supra note 177
(indicating that The Princeton Principles advocate an immunity compromise by allowing sitting heads of state
to be prosecuted for acts committed during their terms in office, but not allowing the actual prosecution to occur
until after the head of state leaves his position in office).
284. See Hand, supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing that Belgium's government is
considering amending its 1999 Act providing for universal jurisdiction to forbid sitting heads of state to be
prosecuted until they have left their positions in office).
285. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 188 (holding that if a State
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The Principles also eliminate amnesty as a defense in most instances. The
Principles allow prosecution of persons previously granted amnesty by the
government of the State where a crime covered by The Principles occurred.2 6 If
the amnesty is inconsistent with an international duty to hold persons committing
the atrocities condemned by The Principles accountable, amnesty is not
recognized as a defense.28 Thus, under The Principles, the determination of
whether the defense of amnesty is granted turns on the traditional analysis under
international law. Therefore, uncertainty still exists on whether amnesty for
crimes against humanity is valid under international law because The Principles
do not speak to the issue.
The Principles28 grant States universal jurisdiction over persons committing
the international crimes of piracy,29 slavery,290 war crimes,291' crimes against
'92 29329peace, crimes against humanity, 2 3 genocide,2  and torture."' This list is not
prosecutes a serving leader of another State, the prosecuting State is in violation of international law). See
generally PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 48-51 (discussing the history under international law of
allowing substantive and procedural immunities to be successfully advanced as defenses to the enforcement of
universal jurisdiction).
286. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 31. Principle 7-Amnesties "Amnesties are
generally inconsistent with the obligation of states to provide accountability for serious crimes under
international law..." and "the exercise of universal jurisdiction with respect to serious crimes under
international law.., shall not be precluded by amnesties which are incompatible with the international legal
obligations of the granting state." Id. at Section 2; see also Laura Secor, Justice Without Borders, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2001, at 80 (addressing the conclusions of The Princeton Principles and their purpose of standardizing
the procedure for the exercise of universal jurisdiction by individual countries).
287. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 52.
288. See Id. at 29 (specifying that Principle 2 also states "[tihe application of universal jurisdiction to the
crimes listed.., is without prejudice to the application of universal jurisdiction to other crimes under
international law"). The list provided in Principle 2 is not exhaustive. Id. at 48.
289. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that aircraft hijacking
falls under the principle of universal jurisdiction because it is recognized under the law of nations as air piracy).
290. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 444 (1999) (reaffirming that "the use of
unpaid, forced labor during World War II' violates the law of nations as a form of slavery and is "sufficient to
state a cause of action for participation in slave trading").
291. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L L. REP. 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem 1961),
affd 36 INT'L L. REP. 277, 278 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962) (stating that comprising the conviction for war crimes
consisted of "persecution, expulsion and murder .... in so far as these were done during the Second World War
against Jews from among the populations of the States occupied by the Germans and by the other Axis States").
292. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 68 (defining crimes against peace as "planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing");
see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 259, at 17 (indicating that in drafting the Nuremberg Charter, Stalin, Churchill
and Roosevelt spent a lot of "time, effort and ingenuity" defining and searching for a valid legal basis to make
crimes against peace, or what they referred to as the crime of aggression, crimes under international law).
293. See Attorney General v. Adolph Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 5, 278 (1968) (convicting Adolf
Eichmann of crimes against humanity for the commission of atrocities, including murder, extermination,
enslavement, starvation and deportation of civilian Jew populations, persecution of Jews on national, racial,
religious, and political grounds, and spoliation of the property of Jews by inhumane measures involving
compulsion, theft, terrorism and torture).
294. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald,
dissenting) (arguing that Germany waived its sovereign immunity by violating the jus cogens norms of
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exhaustive and can be expanded in the future to include alleged acts of forced
disappearance and borderless cyber-crime in conjunction with combating
296
transnational organized crime. However, because the final text of The
Principles was not completed until January 27, 2001, there are not yet any
examples of States adopting or applying The Principles. 97 If States adopt The
Principles, then a uniform system of rules will guide the exercise of universal
jurisdiction and provide due process safeguards that may or may not exist in
295
State courts operating under different sets of rules.
2. Putting The Principles into Practice
In order for The Principles to be effective in creating uniformity in the
exercise of universal jurisdiction by the States, the drafters and other human
rights organizations and groups must promote the adoption of The Principles. In
the beginning, this may be difficult to accomplish because The Principles are
relatively new and there are no examples of their application. 29 Although The
Principles have not been applied in reality, it is possible to determine how The
Principles would work by hypothetically applying them to actual cases.
For instance, if The Principles were applied to Sharon, then universal
jurisdiction would not be enforceable because he is currently the Prime Minister
of Israel.3 O However, Sharon would not be exonerated from future prosecution
for acts committed in violation of universal jurisdiction once his term in office
international law condemning genocide and that the United States could exercise universal jurisdiction because
the atrocities committed by the Nazi Party in the holocaust amounted to grave breaches of the jus cogens
norms).
295. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that official torture,
defined as "any act by which severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by
or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as ... intimidating him or other persons"
under the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, is now prohibited
clearly and unambiguously by the law of nations).
296. See Robinson, supra note 264, at 16 (indicating "[tihe UN Declaration on the Protection of all
Persons from Enforced Disappearances... provides for the exercise of universal jurisdiction for alleged acts of
forced disappearances"). "Universal jurisdiction was discussed recently at the symposium on the challenge of
borderless cyber-crime to international efforts to combat transnational organized crime, held in conjunction with
the signing conference for the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in Palermo, Italy." Id.
297. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 26, 49 (describing the process for the drafting and
adoption of the final text of The Princeton Principles, including their inability to satisfy every participant).
298. See Bill Newill, Associated Press, Legal Scholars Issue Principles to Guide International
Jurisdiction for War Crimes, N. COUNTY TIMES, July 23, 2001, available at http://www.nctimes.com/news/
2001/20010723/55756.html (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (discussing the purpose and the
substance of The Princeton Principles, as well as the supporting and the opposing views).
299. See Princeton Univ., Jurists Demand End to hnpunity: Announce "Princeton Principles" on
Universal Jurisdiction for Heinous Crimes (July 23, 2001), available at http://www.princeton.edu/
prlnewsl0l/q310723-principles.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lastwer) (indicating the Principles
were announced, on July 23, 2001, as guidelines to govern universal jurisdiction).
300. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 49 (indicating that Principle 5 recognizes the
defense of immunity for sitting heads of state).
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ends.30' Thus, in this type of situation, The Principles would put the victim and
the international community's right to justice on hold indefinitely.0 2 Allowing
heads of state immunity from universal jurisdiction until they leave office is
problematic because the individual may be too old and lacking the capacity for
prosecution by the time the term is finished."3
As a solution to the lack of uniformity in universal jurisdiction, The
Principles could work to create a uniform set of universal jurisdiction laws if
States adopt them. By design, The Principles are intended to comport with
international law as evidenced by their stance on immunity and amnesty. The
Principles eliminate amnesty in most instances, as well as immunity for former
heads of state. However, the amount of flexibility allowed by The Principles may
end up creating an even greater lack of uniformity if, when States adopt them, the
States make changes in the process.
B. Formation and Implementation of the International Criminal Court
Another solution to create uniformity besides the adoption of The Principles
is creation of the International Criminal Court. Sixty countries must ratify the
Rome Statute, the treaty intended to create the International Criminal Court,
before the Court will come into existence.3 4 The ratification of the Rome Statute
by sixty States is a distinct and real possibility by 2003.305 One hundred and
twenty countries approved the Rome Statute when it was drafted in 1998. 3° As of
301. See id. at 48 (indicating that Principle 5 does not recognize immunity for heads of state once their
term in office ends).
302. See id. at 51 (explaining that head of state immunity will remain in effect until the person steps
down from his position as head of state).
303. See Cassel, supra note 177 (indicating that although Spain had universal jurisdiction over Pinochet,
the Court ultimately found Pinochet lacked the capacity to stand trial because he was too old and was in poor
health). The Principles would do away with statutes of limitations for covered crimes. See generally PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES, supra note 176, at 51-52 (discussing the Principles' position on statutes of limitations as
promulgated by Principle 11).
304. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9, pt. 13, art. 126 (July
17, 1998), available at http:llwww.un.orgllawicc/statute/99-porr/13.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute] (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer). When 60 States have ratified, "the Statute shall enter into force on the first
day of the month after the 60th day following the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession." Id.; see also Sharon A. Williams, F.R.S.C., The Rome Statute on the
International Criminal Court: From 1947-2000 and Beyond, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 297, 325 (2000) (outlining
the drafting of the Rome Statute and indicating that there must be sixty ratifications of the statute before the
International Criminal Court can become operative).
305. See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http:/Iuntreaty.
un.orglENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVIIltreatyl0.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (indicating that as of February 2002, 52 states out of the required sixty
have ratified the Rome Treaty); see also Williams, supra note 304, at 325 (postulating that as of the summer of
2000, the ICC would be a reality within approximately two years).
306. See United Nations, The International Criminal Court, at http:lwww.un.orglNews/facts/
iccfact.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (indicating that the Statute
was approved by an unrecorded vote with 120 States in favor versus seven States in opposition). The treaty was
drafted in Rome, Italy. Id.
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February of 2002, the Rome Statute has been signed by one hundred and thirty-
nine States and ratified by fifty-two States.3"7
Once sixty States have ratified the Rome Statute, it will be approximately a
year before the International Criminal Court comes into operationit 3 The
International Criminal Court will be a permanent institution located at the Hague
in the Netherlands. ° It will have eighteen judges, elected by an assembly of
signatory States after being nominated by such governments.3 0 In addition, the
prosecutors will be elected by the same assembly and will serve a nine-year
term."' The prosecutor has the power to initiate investigations on his own or
based on a referral of the Security Council or a State party, but the judges closely
monitor all investigations.
'1 2
The pending formation of the International Criminal Court31 3 will play a
significant role in the domestication of universal jurisdiction throughout the
world.3 4 However, the International Criminal Court is only a supplement to
domestic laws on universal jurisdiction. 3 It will "exercise jurisdiction only




The limited jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court will require States to
adopt and to apply domestic legislation on universal jurisdiction where the
International Criminal Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to ensure
accountability. 7 In addition, this means if States do not want to submit to the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, they must have and apply laws
307. See United Nations, supra note 305 (listing all signatories to the Rome Statute, as well as States
that have ratified the treaty).
308. See Press Release, United Nations, Portugal and Ecuador join the International Criminal Court;
Only Eight Ratifications Remain Before the ICC Treaty Enters into Force (Feb. 6, 2002), available at 2002 WL
4158827 (explaining that during this one-year period the framework of the Court will be established, along with
election of senior officials).
309. See ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 331. The Hague already hosts the International Court of Justice
and the Hague International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Id.
310. See id. at 351 (explaining the composition of the International Criminal Court once it comes into
existence). "At least half the judges must have 'relevant' criminal law experience, although this may be entirely
prosecutorial." Id.
311. See id. at 352.
312. See generally id. at 353-64 (discussing the procedural rules of the International Criminal Court,
including prosecution powers, the hearing, punishments, and appeals); see also RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note
27, at 182-84 (explaining the general procedure of the Court from receipt of the complaint to the judgment).
313. See Rome Statute, supra note 304 (creating the International Criminal Court with limited universal
jurisdiction).
314. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship Between
the Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 921 (2000) (proposing that even when the
International Criminal Court comes into force, "national courts will remain the principle vehicles for
international criminal law enforcement").
315. See United Nations, supra note 306 (maintaining that "[u]nder the principle of 'complementarity,'
the International Criminal Court will act only when national courts are unable or unwilling").
316. Sadat, supra note 314, at 921.
317. See id.
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providing for universal jurisdiction. 8 However, States may want a neutral
international criminal court overseeing the prosecution of its citizens rather than
turning the proceedings over to another State.3 '9 Therefore, domestic legislation
allowing the use of universal jurisdiction will be promoted and guided by the
decisions of the International Criminal Court.
1. Relevant Provisions of the Rome Statute
The International Criminal Court will only be able to assert jurisdiction over
persons if the State where the crime occurred or the State harboring the criminal
has ratified the Rome Statute. 20 For example, in order to have proper jurisdiction
over Osama Bin Laden for the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade
Center in the United States,3 ' the Treaty would require either the United States,
or Afghanistan, the extraditing state allegedly harboring Bin Laden, to be a party
to the Treaty in order for the Court to have jurisdiction.32 Even if the
International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction in a case where neither
State has ratified the Rome Statute, individual States may still prosecute
perpetrators of human rights crimes under domestic laws on universal
jurisdiction"3 Therefore, perpetrators would not be able to escape prosecution by
fleeing to States that have not ratified the Rome Statute.
32
The International Criminal Court can also have jurisdiction if the State, of
which the perpetrator is a citizen or where the commission of the crime took
place, has not ratified the Rome Statute. z The United Nations Security Council
318. See id.
319. See Melissa K. Marler, The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes
in the Rome Statute, 49 DUKE LJ. 825, 838 (1999) (explaining the ability of a State to consent to the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over one of its citizens under the Rome Statute).
320. See Richard Goldstone, Terrorists Can be Brought to Justice Only by Legal Means, INDEP.
(London), Oct. 2, 2001, at 5 (noting that "it is crucial... for the powerful nations to adhere to the provisions of
international humanitarian law," and addressing the United States' reaction to the events of September 11,
2001). "If the International Criminal Court were functioning today, it would only have jurisdiction over those
responsible if the United States, where the crimes were committed, or the countries that are shielding the
perpetrators, had ratified the treaty." Id.
321. See SAfrica: Human Rights Foundation Press Release on USA "War Crimes" in Afghanistan, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Dec. 4, 2001 (indicating that the attack on the World Trade Center resulted in "the
deaths of 5,000 innocent civilians and has been condemned worldwide for that").
322. See Goldstone, supra note 320.
323. See Marler, supra note 319, at 837 (examining the inability of perpetrators to escape prosecution
for human rights violations if the International Criminal Court lacks jurisdiction due to the perpetrator's travels
to non-party States); see also AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 82 (indicating that "approximately 95 states have
enacted legislation which would permit their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over persons suspected of
at least some crimes against humanity, such as murder, torture or rape, in certain circumstances").
324. See Marler, supra note 319, at 837-38 (postulating that the criminal will be subject to prosecution
somewhere regardless of whether it is in front of the International Criminal Court or a State court).
325. See United Nations, supra note 306 (answering the question of who decides what cases the
International Criminal Court will hear by giving three alternatives: referral of cases by States or initiation of
investigation by the Court's Prosecutor "if the State in whose territory the crime was committed, or the State of
399
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can refer the case to the International Criminal Court in accordance with its duty
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.326 Chapter VII begins with
Article 39, which provides: "The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security. 327 Article 41 gives the Security Council the power to decide what types
of non-violent measures are to be used to make parties to the United Nations
comply with requirements under Article 39 if they choose not to comply
voluntarily. 321 In addition, the Security Council may call for any other necessary
action if its powers under Article 41 would not remedy the situation.32 9 Situations
involving a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression include
internal and international armed conflicts.3 ° Therefore, if a crime gives rise to the
Security Council's duties under Chapter VII, it would have the power to make an
independent referral to the International Criminal Court for investigation of the
alleged perpetrator.
Although the Court may obtain jurisdiction through States that have ratified
the Rome Statute or through the U.N. Security Council, the International
Criminal Court may still be unable to hear a case because its jurisdiction is not
retroactive.33 The existence of the International Criminal Court is the date the
the nationality of the accused, is party to the Statute," or the UN Security Council can refer cases under Chapter
Seven of the UN Charter).
326. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see UNITED NATIONS, supra note 320
(explaining that where the UN Security Council has referred the case under the UN Charter, it is not necessary
for the State where the crimes occurred or the State of which the perpetrator is a citizen be a party to the
Treaty).
327. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
328. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Id.
329. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.
Id.
330. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32, 42-43 (1995) (discussing the power of the Security Council to
invoke Chapter VII under the United Nations Charter).
331. See Abigail Levene, No World Court Trial for World's Most Wanted Man, GLOBAL POLICY
FORUM, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2001/1012ij.htm (Dec. 10, 2001) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer) (indicating that the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center by
Osama Bin Laden would fall outside the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court when it comes into
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Rome Statute reaches sixty ratifications, not the effective date, a year later.332
In regard to the issue of immunity, there will be no exemptions from the
exercise of jurisdiction over human rights violations covered by the statute.333 The
Rome Statute essentially does away with immunity altogether. "The ICC is
founded on the belief that no tyrant, president or general should be free to kill,
maim, burn and destroy without accountability and sanction.' 3 4 The International
Criminal Court's rejection of all forms of immunity comports with international
law.335 Thus, the International Criminal Court will act as one of the only forums
available for the prosecution of sitting heads of state.336
2. Supporters of the Rome Statute
Some of the proponents of the Rome Statute include Belgium, Britain,
France, Germany, Israel and Spain.337 A common theme among States supporting
the Rome Statute is to end immunity. Britain, one of the most adamant supporters
of the Rome Statute, views the statute as a "vital international mechanism to
ensure that dictators, torturers and oppressors around the world cannot do what
they like with impunity, but are brought to justice., 38 Britain's Foreign Secretary,
Jack Straw, believes the creation of an International Criminal Court is necessary
to ensure accountability for violations of humanitarian law.339 Estonia, the fiftieth
State to ratify the Rome Statute, announced that it "is committed to supporting
the role of the future International Criminal Court in ending an era of
existence because the events occurred prior to the ICC's formation).
332. See Press Release, supra note 308 (stating that "[w]hile the Court's jurisdiction will be effective
from the day of the Rome Statute's entry into force, the Court will not begin operations until its framework has
been established").
333. See Susan Waltz, Prosecuting Dictators: International Law and the Pinochet Case, 18 WORLD
POL'Y J. (Apr. 1, 2001), available at 2001 WL 22301399 ("Official capacity as Head of state or Government
shall in no case exempt the person for criminal responsibility under this statute.").
334. Warren Allmand, ICC is Better Than Doing Nothing, NAT'L POST, Aug. 7,2000, at A12, available
at 2000 WL 24930515 (pointing out that the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court will not
destroy the peace initiative, and although it may not be a solution to the problem of crimes against humanity, it
is an improvement upon the domestic application of universal jurisdiction for the perpetrators of these crimes);
see also Jonathan I. Chamey, Editorial Comments: International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic
Courts, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 120, 123 (2001) (stating that "the purpose of establishing the ICC is to eliminate
impunity for international crimes").
335. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 188.
336. See id. (indicating that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda may also prosecute sitting heads of state).
337. See United Nations, supra note 305 (listing all participants in the drafting of the Rome Statute and
their status as signatories, as well as ratification, acceptance, approval, and accession status).
338. Andrew Parker, Cook Moves to Back World Criminal Court, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 2000,
at 4 (quoting British Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain).
339. See United Kingdom Ratifies the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), HERMEs
DATABASE, OcL 4, 2001 (indicating that Straw does not believe that there has been such a genuine attempt to
create accountability for human rights violations since the Geneva Conventions in 1949).
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impunity."34° The Ecuadorian Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Aleman,
made a similar statement supporting the end of immunity.34' Thus, an increasing
number of States are recognizing the need to hold leaders accountable for their
actions.
3. Opposition to the Rome Statute
In contrast to the arguments posed by the supporters to end immunity, state
sovereignty is advanced as the reason States oppose the Rome Statute. The
United States is at the forefront of opposing the Rome Statute and the creation of
an international criminal court on the terms of the Rome Statute. 2 The United
States claims the ability of the International Criminal Court to acquire
jurisdiction over persons whose State of citizenship has neither ratified the Rome
Statute nor consented to jurisdiction over the individual would be in violation of
the law of treaties.34' Furthermore, the United States argues there is no precedent
for allowing the International Criminal Court to exercise jurisdiction over an
individual whose State of nationality has not given its consent to the
prosecution.3" The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, the Tokyo Tribunal, and the Nuremberg Tribunal all based their
jurisdiction on some form of consent by the State whose citizens were on trial.34'
In addition, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, has voiced
concerns that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court could lead to
politically motivated prosecutions.346  The United States worries that these
340. See Estonia Joins Ranks of Central and Eastern European States' Support of the International
Criminal Court, M2 PRESSWIRE, Jan. 31, 2001, available at 2002 WL 4158262 (quoting a statement made by
Marina Kaijurand, Deputy Under-Secretary of Legal and Consular Affairs for the Estonia Ministry of Foreign
Affairs). Estonia's official ratification of the International Criminal Court required the State to amend its laws to
conform to the type of jurisdiction that will be exercised by the International Criminal Court due to
inconsistencies regarding issues of immunity and extradition. Id.
341. See Press Release, supra note 308 (announcing that only eight more ratifications remain before the
Rome Statute enters into force to create the first permanent international criminal court).
342. See Guy Roberts, Critical Essay: Assault on Sovereignty: The Clear and Present Danger of the
New International Criminal Court, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 35 (2001) (discussing the United States' support of
a permanent international criminal court prior to the Rome Conference and its vote against the Rome Statute
along with six other States).
343. See Madeline Morris, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Over Nationals of Non-
Party States, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 362 (2000) (indicating that the United States' argument poses a real
problem with regard to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over nationals of non-party States
that have not consented to its jurisdiction); see generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (setting forth the law of treaties, which applies to all
treaties between States).
344. See Morris, supra note 343, at 367.
345. See id. at 366-67 (stating that the "The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda base their jurisdiction on Security Council powers under Chapter VII"). "The Tokyo Tribunal after
WWII based its jurisdiction on Japan's consent. And the Nuremberg Tribunal based its jurisdiction on the
consent of the Allies, acting as the German sovereign." Id.
346. See Newill, supra note 298 (discussing President Bush's refusal to ratify the Rome Statute that
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politically motivated prosecutions may be used to prosecute American soldiers
stationed throughout the world.347 Thus, some States are still unwilling to turn
over the prosecution of its leaders to another forum, whether it be another State
or a neutral body.
Uniformity may be created as a result of the International Criminal Court
because States will not always want to conform to its jurisdiction. Therefore, it
may press States to adopt a uniform system of laws providing for universal
jurisdiction. As a supplemental forum for the prosecution of human rights
violations, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States will become
imperative. In addition, by not recognizing immunity or amnesty as defenses, the
International Criminal Court will be vital in holding leaders accountable for their
actions. Thus, the International Criminal Court can play an important, albeit
indirect, role in the uniform application of universal jurisdiction by States.
V. CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that individuals violating human rights law must be held
accountable. In addition, a uniform system of accountability is necessary. The
Principles are a viable mechanism to achieve accountability because their
intended purpose is to act as guidelines for States to adopt, which will ensure
prosecution of individuals under universal jurisdiction. The enforcement of
universal jurisdiction under The Principles comports with international law by
allowing heads of state to maintain the defense of immunity until the end of their
term in office. However, this is only a small step in the fight to hold leaders
accountable in spite of their positions of power. Because there are no examples of
their adoption or application, it is difficult to determine how successful The
Principles would be in practice.
In addition to adoption of uniform domestic legislation by all States, the
International Criminal Court will be useful in raising the level of accountability
as well as adding to the creation of an international criminal justice system. The
"no immunity" policy of the International Criminal Court may lead domestic
courts to concede jurisdiction in cases where sitting heads of state require
prosecution. In this respect, States adopting The Principles could harmoniously
co-exist with the International Criminal Court to provide accountability for
atrocities committed by State leaders, past or present.
would create the International Criminal Court).
347. See Evo Popoff, Inconsistency and Impunity in International Human Rights Law: Can the
International Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rivanda and Augusto Pinochet Cases, 33 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 363, 392-93 (2001) (discussing the United States' opposition to the creation of the
International Criminal Court because it is viewed as an attack on state sovereignty).

